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INTRODUCTION
This article is about individual lawyers innovating in the practice of law.
It theorizes that technology, cultural trends, and market forces have the po-
tential to awaken latent markets for one-to-one legal services grounded in the
sharing economy, the commons, do-it-yourself (DIY) businesses, and similar
endeavors. These forces might reshape the solo practice of law, which in
turn might help bring about structural change in the legal system. Despite
the mass commoditization of many law products, there is potentially a new
market for craft-oriented lawyers who directly connect with clients.
When we connect the sharing economy and the cultural values that sup-
port it, with the ability to connect with clients over the Internet, new practice
style opportunities emerge for solo practitioners (and lawyers practicing in
small firms). The lawyers operating in this new market space are "indie"'
lawyers. Generally speaking, the term indie connotes independence from cor-
porate sponsorship.2 Indie also refers to a market approach that combines
economic and non-economic motives. "Unlike a majority of global firms,
many [indie] producers are not solely motivated by economic profit, but
rather a combination of emotional and monetary rewards."3 For instance, in-
die producers may find motivation in earning a sustainable living, cultivating
creativity, earning the respect of their peers, or making the world a better
place.4
As applied to lawyering, indie emphasizes the independent and autono-
mous characteristics of the lawyer's work, as well as his or her focus on the
community and the collective good. Indie also works as a rhetorical response
to the negative view that legal culture projects onto solo and small-firm prac-
1. See Indie, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Indie (last visited June 25,
2014) (Indie is a short form of the word "independent" and may refer to a wide
variety of cultural products such as design, computer games, music, and film.).
2. Id.; see also Brian J. Hracs et al., Standing Out in the Crowd: The Rise of
Exclusivity-Based Strategies to Compete in the Contemporary Marketplace for
Music and Fashion, 45 ENVIRONMENT AND PLANNING A 1144, 1145 (2013)
("[I]ndie refers to individuals and small groups who produce cultural goods and
services on their own."); Steve Albini, The Problem With Music, 5 THE BAF-
FLER, at *] (1994), available at http://www.thebaffler.com/salvos/the-problem-
with-music (In music, the term refers to bands that produce their music outside
of major label recording contracts.). See generally MICHAEL AZERRAD, OUR
BAND COULD BE YOUR LIFE: SCENES FROM THE AMERICAN INDIE UNDER-
GROUND 1981-1991 (2002); HENRY H. OWINGS, THE INDIE CRED TEST (Perigee
Trade 2012) (2011); ANDREW EARLES, GIMME INDIE ROCK (2014).
3. Hracs et al., supra note 2, at 1145.
4. Id.
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titioners. Solo practitioners5 are perceived as occupying the lowest rung on
the legal profession's ladder6 and statistically have received the most profes-
sional discipline for ethics violations.7 The general view is that solo practi-
tioners are the most unethical segment of the legal profession.8 As the legal
community continues to confront the severe scarcity of legal jobs in relation
to legal jobseekers,9 it is time to re-imagine solo practice.
However, for the indie lawyer to thrive, the legal community must re-
vamp several key ethical regulations that obstruct these new professional
pathways. These ethical rules include bars on direct solicitation, multi-juris-
dictional practice, layperson participation in law firm structure, multi-disci-
plinary practice, and undue restrictions on lawyer speech.
The ideas and examples in this article, however, are in no way offered
as a panacea for the ailments that so deeply afflict the legal profession and
legal education. This is not an article arguing for the versatility and value of
the JD. To fully capitalize on the transformative possibilities of solo practice,
other structural changes must take place, particularly in legal education. The
cost of legal education must fall. Somehow the "wicked"o problem of high-
tuition that afflicts all of higher education must be solved; it is not possible to
be independent and innovative when burdened with over $100,000 in student
loan debt.
Part One of this article will briefly review current scholarship on eco-
nomics and innovation in the legal profession and then offer an alternative
framework for thinking about innovation in the law. Part Two will explore
5. Although the author refers to solo practitioners throughout this article, these
thoughts equally apply to lawyers practicing in a small firm setting.
6. Leslie C. Levin, Preliminary Reflections on the Professional Development of
Solo and Small Firm Practitioners, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 847, 847-48 (2001)
[hereinafter Levin, Professional Development of Solo and Small Firm Practi-
tioners]; JEROME E. CARLIN, LAWYERS ON THEIR OWN xiv (Quid Pro Press
2011) (1962) [hereinafter CARLIN, LAWYERS ON THEIR OWN].
7. Levin, Professional Development of Solo and Small Firm Practitioners, supra
note 6, at 851; Leslie C. Levin, The Ethical World of Solo and Small Law Firm
Practitioners, 41 Hous. L. REV. 309, 312-13 (2004) [hereinafter Levin, The
Ethical World of Solo and Small Law Firm Practitioners].
8. CARLIN, LAWYERS ON THEIR OWN, supra note 6, at xv; JEROME CARLIN, LAW-
YERS' ETHICS: A SURVEY OF THE NEW YORK CITY BAR 66-'68 (1966) [herein-
after CARLIN, LAWYERS' ETHICS].
9. Paul Campos, The Crisis of the American Law School, 46 U. MICH. J. L. RE-
FORM 177, 215 (2012) (There is a 2:1 ratio between available legal jobs and
legal jobseekers.).
10. See Judith Wegner, Reframing Legal Education's "Wicked Problems", 61
RUTGERS L. REV. 867, 870-71 (2009) (Horst Rittel and Melvin Webber define
a "wicked problem" as one that "cannot be definitively described or understood
(since it is differently seen by differing stakeholders, has numerous causes, and
is often a symptom of other problems).").
2014]
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the political and social theories along with cultural and market forces that are
driving new sustainable ways of doing business. These concepts include: the-
ories that emphasize autonomy, limited growth, and shared resources; par-
ticipatory and community-centered cultural trends; DIY practices; long-tail
markets enabled by technology; consumer demand for customized products;
and the sharing economy. These interconnected forces have the capacity to
impact the way professional legal services are consumed and delivered.
Part Three will sketch the contours of the indie lawyer of the future and
provides current examples and future possibilities. Part Four will address the
different ways legal ethics rules should be remodeled to enable this new style
of lawyering to flourish. Suggestions include: modifying the ban on lawyer
solicitation; enabling multi-jurisdictional law practice; allowing non-lawyers
to hold ownership interests in law firms; allowing law firms to combine legal
and non-legal services; and relaxing restrictions on lawyer speech related to
judicial officials.
I. OFF-THE-RACK LAW AND LAWBOTS-Is THIS THE
FUTURE OF LAW?
Much of the scholarship on the future of law advances an economic and
corporate angle and emphasizes innovation, market disruption, technology,
and the inevitable destruction of the human counselor at law who imparts
practical wisdom" to his or her clients. Technology is displacing lawyers
who provide individualized one-to-one legal services to individual clients.12
A major theme is the death of "bespoke" legal services. In a new, fluid, and
swift-moving business landscape, the traditional, individualized model of law
practice is too slow, too cumbersome, and requires too much human capital.13
"Traditional, hand-crafted, one-to-one, consultative professional service[s],
highly tailored for the specific needs of particular clients" are falling by the
wayside in favor of off-the-rack legal products.14 These one-size-fits-all legal
products are made possible by unbundling different legal tasks and packag-
11. See ANTHONY KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER, FAILING IDEALS OF THE LEGAL
PROFESSION 223-25 (1993) (Lawyers should strive for the ancient Aristotlean
virtue of practical wisdom, the ability of the lawyer to see beyond abstract legal
rules and reach conclusions based on the law and its context).
12. RICHARD SUSSKIND, THE END OF LAWYERS 4 (2008) [hereinafter SUSSKIND,
THE END OF LAWYERS]; BENJAMIN BARTON, A GLASS HALF FULL LOOK AT
THE LEGAL PROFESSION (forthcoming Oxford 2015) (manuscript at 13) (on file
with author).
13. Gillian K. Hadfield, Legal Infrastructure and the New Economy, 8 1/S J.L. &
POL'Y 1, 39-40 (2012) [hereinafter, Hadfield, Legal Infrastructure].
14. SUSSKIND, THE END OF LAWYERS, supra note 12, at 29-32, 237, 247; see also
RICHARD SUSSKIND, TOMORROW'S LAWYERS 126-27 (2013) [hereinafter SUSS-
KIND, TOMORROW'S LAWYERS].
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ing legal services as a systematized and commoditized product. 15 Outsourc-
ing and computerization presume that legal work can be broken into
constituent parts and that not everything needs to be done by a highly paid
human in the United States.16 "Any work that can be routinized and rational-
ized will be swallowed up."17
Society may no longer need the cognitive power of human lawyers
when computers can harness massive channels of data to effectively solve
legal problems. In comparison with human experts, computers, with access to
years of coded data on Supreme Court voting patterns, make better predic-
tions for how the Court will rule on particular cases.18 "Big data" is part of
the future of law.19 Big data encompasses everything from e-discovery, to
legal informatics designed to evaluate litigation risks, to quantitative predic-
tive software that can evaluate the quality of attorneys.20
Widely heralded as disruptive products that garner significant venture
capital, interactive software products like LegalZoom allow individuals to
create wills, trademark names, and incorporate businesses, eliminating the
human lawyer from the transaction.21 Computers use artificial intelligence to
make quantitative legal predictions, evaluate the quality of attorneys, and
predict a particular attorney's chances of success in any endeavor.22 With
computer "lawbots" predicting an attorney's likelihood of winning a case,
performing complex legal analysis by analyzing massive amounts of data,
and generating customized legal documents, the demand for human lawyers
withers away.
Undoubtedly, mass commoditization and systemization have dramati-
cally reshaped the legal services landscape. This author is not sure that indi-
vidualized lawyering can be replaced entirely by computers and interactive
forms. Interactive forms can only go so far. Software is bound to follow
strictly encoded algorithms and routines.23 Generally, artificial intelligence
works "only by tricking us into using a very small part of who we are when
15. SUSSKIND, THE END OF LAWYERS, supra note 12, at 29-32, 237, 247.
16. BARTON, supra note 12, at 108.
17. Id. at 152.
18. Daniel Martin Katz, Quantitative Legal Prediction-Or-How I Learned to
Stop Worrying and Start Preparing For the Data-Driven Future of the Legal
Services Industry, 62 EMORY L. J. 909, 938 (2012-2013).
19. Id.; SUSSKIND, TOMORROW'S LAWYERS, supra note 14, at 48.
20. Katz, supra note 18, at 911, 912, 934-36.
21. BARTON, supra note 12, at 129.
22. Katz, supra note 18, at 934-36.
23. See generally Ian Bogost & Gonzalo Frasca, Videogames Go to Washington:
The Story Behind the Howard Dean for Iowa Game, ELECTRONIC BOOK RE-
VIEW, Apr. 9, 2008, available at http://www.electronicbookreview.com/thread/
firstperson/elective.
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we communicate with [the computer]."24 Software such as LegalZoom gener-
ates a variety of different choices for the user, but in the end, does not allow
people to construct completely unique legal outcomes; it produces only one
of several pre-established outcomes. 25
Software-based legal services also raise questions about professional
norms for the delivery of legal services. Authoritarian lawyering, where the
lawyer "exercises 'predominant control and responsibility for the problem-
solving [that the client passively] delegate[s] to him,'" is a poor model for
lawyering.26 The authoritarian model does not work well because it denies
the client's autonomy and can lead to problems with client buy-in for solu-
tions.27 An authoritarian approach also conflicts with the lawyer's ethical ob-
ligation to allow the client to decide "the objectives of the representation"
and "consult with the client as to the means by which those objectives are to
be pursued."28
The ideal form of lawyering is the collaborative model of lawyering,
where the lawyer and client work together to solve legal problems because it
promotes the best relationship between lawyer and client.29 The collaborative
model enables client autonomy while also encouraging reliance upon the at-
torney's practical wisdom. Because it limits client choice and does not allow
for expansive explanations, algorithmic lawyering is essentially a kind of au-
thoritarian lawyering.
There is still a need for legal counseling that incorporates emotional
intelligence (e.q.). What are the legal and non-legal consequences of any pro-
posed course of action? What are the long-term consequences for making this
legal decision? What will the impact be on the community, my social net-
work, my family?30 Computers cannot effectively answer these kinds of
questions. People caught up in legal situations with heavy emotional and so-
24. LEV MANOVICH, THE LANGUAGE OF NEW MEDIA 33-34 (2001).
25. Id. at 129; see also Frank Pasquale, A More Nuanced View of Legal Automa-
tion, CONCURRING OPINIONS, June 27, 2014, available at http://www.concur
ringopinions.com/archives/2014/06/a-more-nuanced-view-of-legal-automation
.html (arguments promoting legal automation connect up with libertarian argu-
ments advocating for less law, which arguably entails a more simple, more
formalist approach to legal decision-making).
26. See ROBERT F. COCHRAN ET AL., THE COUNSELOR-AT-LAW: A COLLABORA-
TIVE APPROACH TO CLIENT INTERVIEWING AND COUNSELING 2-4 (2d ed. 2006)
(1999) (quoting DOUGLAS E. ROSENTHAL, LAWYER AND CLIENT: WHO'S IN
CHARGE? 2 (1974)).
27. Id. at 5.
28. Id. at 5-6 (quoting MODEL RULES OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY § 1.2 and MODEL
RULES OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY § 1.4).
29. Id. at 6-7.
30. See generally id. (Effective client counseling requires lawyers to establish a
rapport by actively listening to their clients and collaborating with their clients
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cial consequences often want to be able to tell their story to their lawyer, and
eventually, in court. 3' Because computers do not have good listening skills,
they cannot accommodate this deep-seated human need to have one's story
heard.
But something else is missing from the literature on the future of law.
As set forth in the next section, consumption has become much more of a
participatory process. 32 People are turning away from large-scale, globalized
production.33 Consumers are demanding alternatives to mass corporate com-
moditization, and they are seeking more information about where their prod-
ucts are coming from in the supply chain.34 There has been an uptick in
demand for highly tailored, customized products, made possible by Internet
commerce and new technology like 3D printing.35 There has been a rise in
individuals participating in DIY culture, which stresses individual resilience
and independence from mass manufacturing.36 Individuals concerned about
the increasing inequality and corporate dominance in American society are
opting into the sharing economy, a form of exchange that relies on commu-
nity relations, trading, and sharing rather than an individualized conception
of property ownership.37 The sharing economy has generated alternative ap-
proaches to legal concepts such as property and work.38
The thesis here is that these interlocking trends support the concept of a
latent market for bespoke (but inexpensive) legal services that indie lawyers
provide. These services would be specifically tailored to enable individuals
to re-order their everyday life experiences. For instance, these services might
include helping individuals create secure real property arrangements that do
not rely on big bank mortgages, co-housing arrangements, personal property
arrangements that support car sharing, or employment agreements that reflect
a cooperative structure. 39 In addition to transactional services, lawyers might
use technology to deliver one-to-one advice on everything from special edu-
to reach legal solutions; the entire process requires lawyers to marshal and use
their emotional intelligence).
31. See generally Clark D. Cunningham, The Lawyer as Translator, Representa-
tion as Text: Towards an Ethnography of Legal Discourse, 77 CORNELL L.
REV. 1298 (1992) (describing a client's anger at the legal system, perception
that he was being listened to by his lawyers, and frustration at not being able to
tell his side of the story in court).
32. See infra notes 194-206 and surrounding text.
33. See infra notes 121-133 and surrounding text.
34. See infra notes 129-130 and surrounding text.
35. See infra notes 188-218 and surrounding text.
36. See infra notes 148-158 and surrounding text.
37. See infra notes 219-230 and surrounding text.
38. See infra Part III (B).
39. See infra Part III (B).
2014]
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cation law to social security and disability benefits. There could even be a
latent market for helping clients resolve their disputes online.
These anticipated services encompass something different than criminal
defense and family law litigation, longtime staples of solo and small firm
practitioners.40 These are new services aimed at a new market. There are
already a few lawyers operating who are capitalizing on these forces.41 There
are also law students who are imagining ways to tap into the community-
centric sharing economy. 42 This author predicts that society will soon see
more of this type of lawyering in the future. However, for individual lawyers
to tap into this market, some of the professional regulatory structures must
come down. Lawyers must be able to capture the "long-tail" of the market
and capture latent demand by, among other things, being able to directly sell
these services. The next section details the theoretical, cultural, and market
forces that are converging to support this new style of indie lawyering.
II. THEORETICAL, CULTURAL, AND MARKET FORCES GIVING RISE
TO THE INDIE LAWYER OF THE FUTURE
A. Theoretical Forces: Political and Social
Current trends that eschew mass, globalized production models in favor
of local, sustainable, and community-oriented, consumptive practices find
their theoretical roots in three thinkers: Ivan Illich, who wrote about radical
monopolies and conviviality;43 Herman Daly, who championed the sus-
tainability concept; 44 and Elinor Ostrom, an economist who showed that
common ownership models can effectively manage shared resources. 45
1. Ivan Illich: Radical Monopolies and Conviviality
Ivan Illich was a Roman Catholic priest and philosopher who found his
largest audience in the 1970s.46 The appeal of Illich's theories derives, in
part, from his iconoclasm.47 Distrustful of modem medicine, he refused med-
40. BARTON, supra note 12, at 152.
41. See infra notes 296-308 and surrounding text.
42. See infra notes 309-311 and surrounding text.
43. IVAN ILLICH, TOOLS FOR CONVIVIALITY 11, 51 (Ruth Nana Ashen ed., 1973).
44. HERMAN E. DALY, BEYOND GROWTH 1 (1997) [hereinafter DALY, BEYOND
GROWTH].
45. Marco A. Janssen, In Memorium, Elinor Ostrom (1933-2012), 487, NATURE,
172 (2012).
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ical treatment for a tumor on his head.48 When the tumor metastasized, he
began to smoke raw opium, believing opium was a more effective remedy
than pills.49 It is unclear whether Illich's politics most align with libertarian
conservatives or progressive anarchists.50 His distrust of large-scale, govern-
mental intervention in domestic and foreign settings enamored him with lib-
ertarian-leaning conservatives in both domestic and foreign settings,51 but
progressive leftists also found ground in his zealous criticism of mass com-
modification and excessive corporate power.52
Illich argued that mass production and mass commodification destroy
society by "render[ing] the milieu hostile [because] it extinguishes the free
use of the natural abilities of society's members ... isolates people from each
other and locks them into a [manmade] shell ... [and] undermines the texture
of community by promoting extreme social polarization and splintering spe-
cialization."53 Illich believed that mass society would deny individual auton-
omy and snuff out meaningful social intercourse.54
Illich raised concerns about overdependence on "radical monopolies."55
A product of both states and markets, radical monopolies are pieces of infra-
structure that become embedded in society.56 Things like multi-lane high-
ways and an industrialized model for public education are examples of
radical monopolies.57 Radical monopolies occur "when people give up on
their native ability to do what they can do for themselves and for each other,
in exchange for something better that can be done for them only by a major
tool."58 Once embedded in society, individuals become overly dependent on
radical monopolies. 59 A "[riadical monopoly imposes compulsory consump-
tion and thereby restricts personal autonomy. It constitutes a special kind of
social control because it is enforced by means of the imposed consumption of
a standard product that only large institutions can provide."60 For Illich, radi-





52. See Madar, supra note 46.
53. ILLICH, supra note 43, xxiii (alterations in original).
54. See id. at 10.
55. Id. at 51 (introducing the concept of radical monopolies).
56. See id. at 52.
57. Id. at 36-37, 52.
58. Id. at 54.
59. ILLICH, supra note 43, at 54.
60. Id. at 53.
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tionalization of values" that deprived people of the ability to "satisfy personal
needs in a personal manner."61
Illich theorized that there had to be something better, something be-
tween the market and the state that could encourage individual autonomy and
community.62 For Illich, that something was "conviviality."63 Conviviality, as
opposed to mass society, refers to "autonomous and creative intercourse
among persons, and the intercourse of persons with their environment."64 Il-
lich advocated for convivial reconstruction of society to "fully embrace the
contributions of autonomous individuals in a production system expressly
designed to satisfy the same human needs that it also determines."65 Illich
encouraged his readers to reject mass production and commoditized industry,
and to enable individuals and communities to choose their own lifestyles
through "effective, small-scale renewal."66
Today, Illich's influence is discernible in movements that seek to lessen
dependence on mass globalized production, turning instead toward alterna-
tive endeavors that emphasize community, sharing, and independence.67 The
question this paper explores is what role, if any, individual lawyers might
play in fostering an Illich-inspired convivial reconstruction of society.
61. Id. at 54.
62. See id. at 11.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. ILLICH, supra note 43, at 10.
66. Id. at 73.
67. Colin Lankshear & Michele Knobel, DIY Media: A Contextual Background
and Some Contemporary Themes, in DIY MEDIA: CREATING, SHARING AND
LEARNING WITH NEW TECHNOLOGIES 1, 6-7 (Michele Knobel & Colin Land-
shear eds., 2010) (describing Illich's influence on the DIY movement); Fran-
cesca da Rimini, Social Technologies in the Digital Commons, in HANDBOOK
OF RESEARCH ON OPEN SOURCE SOFTWARE: TECHNOLOGICAL, ECONOMIC, AND
SOCIAL PERSPECTIVES 47, 52 (Kirk St. Amant & Brian Still eds., 2007)
(describing Illich's influence on collaborative open source software produc-
tion); Stephen Quilley, Resilience Through Relocalization: Ecocultures of
Transition? 2 (Ecocultures, Working Paper No. 2012-1, 2011), available at
http://www.web.ca/-bthomson/degrowth/Quilley-2012-1.pdf (describing II-
lich's influence on "Transition," a community-centric movement focused on
limiting dependence on fossil fuels); Stuart Wyllie Macdonald, Tools for Com-
munity: Ivan Illich's Legacy, 8 INT'L J. THROUGH EDUC. ART 121, 121-22
(2012) (describing Illich's legacy in the context of promoting internet-enabled
co-productivity and collaborative creativity); Stephen Quilley, Resilience
Through Relocalization: Ecocultures of Transition? 2, 12 (Ecocultures, Work-
ing Paper No. 2012-1, 2011), available at http://www.web.ca/-bthomson/
degrowth/Quilley-2012-1.pdf (describing Illich's influence on "Transition," a
community-centric movement focused on limiting dependence on fossil fuels).
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2. Herman Daly: Ecological Economics
Herman Daly teaches economics at the University of Maryland and for-
merly served as senior economist in the World Bank's environmental depart-
ment.68 In the 1970s, Daly revitalized John Stuart Mill's concept of the
stationary economic state, and pioneered the term "sustainability" in policy
analysis.69 Daly argued that continuous economic growth was not a workable
goal for the economy or the planet.70
Daly situated the economy within the earth's ecosystem, and referred to
the general laws of thermodynamics to illustrate the unsustainability of un-
limited economic growth.71 When humans and their material things become
so large that natural resource inputs and waste outputs move beyond nature's
ability to replenish its resources and absorb the waste, the throughput flow,
and thus the human population, becomes unsustainable.72
For the past fifty years, growth has been the sine qua non of economic
thinking.73 While continuous growth is a physical impossibility, Daly recog-
nized that limiting growth, in many instances is a political impossibility.74
Nonetheless, Daly warned that the consequences of inaction would be
deleterious.75
Humankind must take the transition to a sustainable economy-
one that takes heed of the inherent biophysical limits of the global
ecosystem so that it can continue to operate long into the future. If
we do not make that transition, we maybe cursed not just with
uneconomic growth but with an ecological catastrophe that would
sharply lower living standards.76
68. Herman Daly, WIKIPEDIA, (Sept. 22, 2013, 10:00 PM), http://en.wikipedia.org/
w/index.php?titledrmanDaly&oldid=622256844.
69. HERMAN E. DALY, BEYOND GROWTH: THE ECONOMICS OF SUSTAINABLE DE-
VELOPMENT 9 (1996) [hereinafter DALY, BEYOND GROWTH].
70. See generally id.; HERMAN E. DALY, Limits to Growth, in ECOLOGICAL Eco-
NOMICS AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT, SELECTED ESSAYS OF HERMAN
DALY 9-11 (2007) [hereinafter DALY, Limits to Growth].
71. DALY, Limits to Growth, supra note 70, at 9.
72. Id.
73. DALY, BEYOND GROWTH, supra note 69, at 27.
74. DALY, Limits to Growth, supra note 70, at 10.
75. HERMAN E. DALY, Economics in a Full World, in ECOLOGICAL ECONOMICS
AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT, SELECTED ESSAYS OF HERMAN DALY 12
(2007) [hereinafter DALY, Economics in a Full World].
76. Id.
20141
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Although continuous growth in the economy is not viable, there can be
continuous development.77 Development, as opposed to growth, means that
production rates should match depreciation rates. 78 In terms of production,
development requires more durable and long-lasting products.79 Maintenance
and repair become more important when development is emphasized, and
these tasks may produce more jobs because they are not easily outsourced.80
Daly argued that economies can no longer resort to the traditional solution
for fighting poverty and joblessness; society cannot continue to ameliorate
poverty and joblessness by stimulating more economic growth.81 Rather,
Daly suggests that people might have to share.82
Daly has influenced contemporary quests for sustainability, qualitative
development, and eco-conscious approaches to sharing resources. His con-
cepts of sustainability and a steady state clearly apply to the legal profession
and legal education. This is beyond the scope of this article, but Daly would
likely argue that the legal community has relied too heavily on a growth
model for legal education and needs to pull back the reins and align law
school seats with available jobs for lawyers. As Daly notes, limits on this
type of growth require an interventionist approach to trade regulation.83 The
relevance of Daly to this article, explored more fully below, is what role
lawyers can play when individuals, communities, and governments seek to
make the transition from growth to development.
3. Elinor Ostrom: The Commons
In 2009, Elinor Ostrom won the Nobel Prize in Economics for her work
on collective governance of shared resources, known as "the commons." 84
"Commons is a general term that refers to a resource shared by a group of
people."85 Ostrom's research questions the validity of Hardin's Tragedy of
the Commons, which posited that if all persons pursue their best interest in
the use of a shared resource, that resource will be ruined through overuse. 86
Ostrom and other commons scholars concluded that "many groups can effec-
77. Id. at 15.
78. Id. at 19.
79. Id. at 19-20.
80. Id. at 22-23.
81. DALY, Economics in a Full World, supra note 75, at 12.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Elinor Ostrom, WIKIPEDIA (Sept. 22, 2013, 10:00 PM), http://en.wikipedia.org/
w/index.php?title=ElinorOstrom&oldid=620365994.
85. CHARLOTTE HESS & ELINOR OSTROM, UNDERSTANDING KNOWLEDGE AS COM-
MONS 4 (2006).
86. Id. at 10- 11.
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tively manage and sustain common resources if they have suitable condi-
tions, such as appropriate rules, good conflict resolution mechanisms, and
well-defined group boundaries."87
Although critics of the commons indicate that these arrangements are
insignificant and unlikely to survive, Ostrom points out that common prop-
erty arrangements are not rare. The corporation is actually a kind of common
property in that no one person holds all the rights.88 Condominiums are a
combination of private and common property. 89 Vacation shares are another
example of common property. 90
One of the largest problems with the management of the commons is
freeriding, where one extracts more from a resource than one has put in.9'
While exclusion or privatization may be remedies for freeriding, Ostrom
notes the power of community and social capital for commons management.
"Users who trust each other are more likely to restrain their use of the com-
mon-pool resource and comply with agreed upon limits of resource use."92
The commons has been applied to everything from collaborative, open-
source production,93 to copyright arrangements, 94 to the Occupy Wall Street
movement.95 In the emergent sharing economy, Ostrom's theories support
the idea that individual and exclusive property ownership may not always be
the best model for managing a resource, and that joint ownership of property
may carry more benefits than an exclusive ownership model. Ostrom's work
becomes relevant to lawyers who might help individuals reorder their every-
day relationships with real and personal property from individual ownership
to sharing models. This article will next look at three intersecting cultural
forces that point to an emerging new market for individual lawyering.
87. Id.
88. Nives Dolsak & Elinor Ostrom, The Challenges of the Commons, in THE COM-
MONS IN THE NEW MILLENIUM: CHALLENGES AND ADAPTATIONS 4 (Nives Dol-
sak & Elinor Ostrom eds., 2003).
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 7-9.
92. Id. at 17.
93. Yochai Benkler, Sharing Nicely: On Shareable Goods and the Emergence of
Sharing as a Modality of Economic Production, 114 YALE L.J. 273, 335 (2004)
[hereinafter Benkler, Sharing Nicely].
94. See CREATIVE COMMONS, http://creativecommons.org/ (last visited Jan. 3,
2015).
95. See MAKING WORLDS: A COMMONS COALIION, http://makingworlds.wikispa
ces.com/ (last visited Jan. 3, 2015) ("Occupy itself is a form of commoning, a
process in which everyone can participate, every voice can contribute, an open
movement that belongs to no one and to everyone.").
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B. Cultural Forces
The increased visibility of participatory, community-focused, and DIY
cultures supports the idea that individuals are following Ivan Illich's advice
and taking more control over their lives. Accordingly, they could be inter-
ested in entering into different legal arrangements in which lawyers would
play a central role.
1. Participatory Culture96
The Internet has engendered a new kind of culture that emphasizes par-
ticipation; for online social interactions, society has a norm of participation.97
As developed below, participatory culture closely aligns with the collabora-
tive model of law practice in which the client and lawyer interact to solve
legal problems.
"The term, participatory culture, contrasts with older notions of passive
media spectatorship."98 Consumers and media producers no longer operate in
separate roles. Instead, they interact under a new paradigm.99 "For example, a
person purchasing a product on Amazon.com might function as a traditional
passive consumer buying a product in the marketplace."loo But "technology
also opens up the potential for the consumer to actively produce information
about the product by writing an online review."101 On the Internet, "[t]he
producers are the audience, the act of making is the act of watching, and
every link [on the web] is both a point of departure and a destination."102
Sharing and collaborating are the hallmarks of participatory culture.
New technology has created a marked "increase in our ability to share, to
cooperate with one another, and to take collective action, all outside the
framework of traditional institutions and organizations."103 People are also
96. Some of the text in this section previously appeared in two of my earlier
articles: Lucille A. Jewel, I Can Has Lawyer? The Conflict Between the
Participatory Culture of the Internet and the Legal Profession, 33 HASTINGS
COMM. & ENT. L.J. 341 (2011). [hereinafter Jewel, I Can Has Lawyer?] and
Lucille A. Jewel, You're Doing It Wrong: How the Anti-Law School Scam
Blogging Movement Can Shape the Legal Profession, 12 MINN. J.L. Sci. &
TECH. 239 (2011) [hereinafter Jewel, You're Doing It Wrong].
97. Jewel, I Can Has Lawyer?, supra note 96, at 347-50.
98. HENRY JENKINS, CONVERGENCE CULTURE: WHERE OLD AND NEW MEDIA COL-
LIDE 3 (2006).
99. Id. at 3.
100. Jewel, I Can Has Lawyer?, supra note 96, at 345.
101. Id.
102. Kevin Kelly, We Are the Web, WIRED (Aug. 2005) http://www.wired.com/
wired/archive/l 3.08/tech.html.
103. CLAY SHIRKY, HERE COMES EVERYBODY: THE POWER OF ORGANIZING WITH-
OUT ORGANIZATIONS 20-21 (2008).
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demonstrating a remarkable eagerness to contribute to online social projects,
even though they do not receive direct economic compensation from these
activities. 104 Clay Shirky offers Wikipedia and Linux as examples of success-
ful projects that have capitalized on people's desire to collectively participate
and contribute to reach an end goal.105 In the case of open-source software
Linux, companies such as IBM have demonstrated that it is possible to profit
from a product that is not owned in the traditional sense. 106
The Internet's capacity to connect large numbers of individuals also en-
ables a new kind of collective wisdom to flourish online. "If you ask a large
enough group of diverse, independent people to make a prediction or esti-
mate a probability, and then average those estimates, the errors each of them
makes in coming up with an answer will cancel themselves out."' 107 The In-
ternet is able to capture this "wisdom of crowds" in the form of many
humans generating answers to a single question, collectively improving
software code, or generating new search results through algorithmic marshal-
ing of massive data on past search queries.108
The final hallmark of participatory culture is its immediacy-events can
be commented upon in real-time as they are unfolding.09 This immediacy,
enabled by new media communication forms such as Twitter and blogs, rep-
resents a substantial change from the slower-paced and highly-filtered, mass-
media, information-dissemination model. Citizens around the world are now
using real-time communication devices to stage spontaneous political pro-
tests and publicize governmental abuses as they occur." 0
There is a connection here between the participatory culture of the In-
ternet and the collaborative lawyering model, discussed above.]', The norm
104. Id. at 143; see also YOCHAi BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS: How So-
CIAL PRODUCTION TRANSFORMS MARKETS AND FREEDOM 7 (2006) [hereinafter
BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS].
105. SHIRKY, supra note 103, at 137, 239-40.
106. Id. at 258-59; BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS, supra note 104, at 124.
107. JAMES SUROWIECKI, THE WISDOM OF CROWDS: WHY THE MANY ARE SMARTER
THAN THE FEW AND How COLLECTIVE WISDOM SHAPES BUSINESS, ECONO-
MIES, SOCIETIES, AND NATIONS 10 (2004).
108. See generally id.
109. MANUEL CASTELLS, THE RISE OF THE NETWORK SOCIETY 491 (Wiley-
Blackwell 2d ed., vol. 1 2010); see also Andrew Keen, Twitter vs CNN: Blood
on the Streets, THE TELEGRAPH, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/
5614541/Twitter-vs-CNN-Blood-on-thestreets.html?mobile=basic (last updated
June 24, 2009) (discussing the view that "instantaneous decentralized Twitter
[is] the speedy future" of journalism, and CNN "represents the all-too-pedes-
trian past").
110. BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS, supra note 103, at 1.39; SHIRKY, supra
note 103, at 184-87.
1Il. See COCHRAN, JR. ET AL., supra note 26 and surrounding text.
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of active participation aligns with a lawyering model that embraces direct
client input in the resolution of legal issues. If society is going to connect
technology with lawyering, the norm of participation and the collaborative
model suggest that the best approach may be a hybrid approach that uses
technology along with human, legal counseling.
Technology increases clients' access to information and control over the
process."12 When the process is aligned with the Internet's participation
norm, this synergy engenders client autonomy and also guarantees that the
lawyer remains actively involved. Clients' participation, however, presup-
poses a live lawyer's involvement. This is because clients cannot effectively
participate in their representation if they do not have access to specific and
individualized legal information that is crafted in response to their situations.
With technology, lawyers can excise expensive office and overhead
costs, grow through the Internet's ability to capture hundreds of clients who
do not need to drive to a law office, and further reduce costs through automa-
tion and systemization of some tasks.113 However, to achieve cost-effective-
ness and to comply with the Internet's culture of immediacy, some
adjustments must be made to the traditional craft-model of lawyer counsel-
ing. For instance, the legal marketplace may have to accept a limited time in
which a lawyer can interface with a client, answer questions, and impart
wisdom.
Richard Granat's mdfamilylaw.com business model is one example of a
successful hybrid model that combines Internet-driven forms with human le-
gal counseling.' 4 Granat is a solo practitioner who conducts his Maryland
business remotely from Florida by enabling clients to use his forms and then
spending a little time on each client's matter daily."15 At the time the ABA
profiled Granat, he was making $100,000 a day from this business.16 Now
Granat also operates directlaw.com, a business aimed at helping other law-
yers start Internet-based practices.117 Granat's business model has success-
fully seized on the Internet's participatory culture and represents the future of
solo practice. While Granat's business has been a great success, this author
advocates for a bit more face timel18 between the lawyer and client, both
112. SHIRKY, supra note 103, at 196.
113. CASTELLS, supra note 109, at 266.
114. Granat Legal Servs., P.C., About Us, MD FAMILY LAWYER.coM, http://www
.mdfamilylawyer.com/about.asp (last visited Sept. 21, 2014).
115. Stephanie Francis Ward, Richard Granat: Internet Obsessive, A.B.A.J. LEGAL
REBELS (Aug. 24, 2009, 9:19 PM), http//www.abajoumal.com/legalrebels/arti
cle/intemet obsessive.
116. Id.
117. DIRECT LAW, http://www.directlaw.com (last visited Sept. 15, 2014).
118. Ward, supra note 115 (According to the ABA journal profile, Granat only
spends thirty minutes a day interfacing with mdfamily clients.).
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before and after the client interacts with the forms. A competing business
model might do well to offer more lawyer face time at a slightly greater cost.
2. Community Centered Culture
Community is the second cultural force relevant to indie lawyering.
Community is a "set of people who share a special kind of identity and cul-
ture and regular, patterned social interaction.", 19 In a community, there is a
sense of neighborliness, warmth, support, and belonging.20 There are two
types of community-related trends that are relevant to this article: (1) a gen-
eral social emphasis on local communities and community values; and (2)
new Internet communities.
a. The Community Values Trend
The first trend relates to Ivan Illich's concept of convivial reconstruc-
tion. Discussed above, Illich urges people to actively form bonds within their
local communities so that they become less dependent on large-scale institu-
tional structures like multi-national corporations and government bureaucra-
cies.121 This direction is seen in the newfound consumer interest in buying
local products, which ensures that money goes back to the local community
rather than the coffers of distant corporations.122 A concern for community
manifests in rising consumer demand for fair trade products123 and for manu-
facturers like American Apparel that touts its sweatshop-free credentials,124
119. MARY CHAYKO, PORTABLE COMMUNITIES: THE SOCIAL DYNAMICS OF ONLINE
AND MOBILE CONNECTEDNESS 6 (2008).
120. Id.
121. See supra notes 65-66 and surrounding text.
122. Julia Lyon, 'Buy local' Campaigns Can Actually Supercharge Sales, CNN
MONEY (Mar. 28, 2014, 7:10 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2014/03/28/smallbus
iness/buy-local/; BRIAN HALWEIL, HOME GROWN, THE CASE FOR LOCAL FOOD
IN A GLOBAL MARKET 7-8 (2002); JANELLE ORSI, PRACTICING LAW IN THE
SHARING ECONOMY 6 (2012) [hereinafter, ORSI, PRACTICING LAW IN THE SHAR-
ING ECONOMY].
123. Jens Hainmueller et al., Consumer Demand for the Fair Trade Label: Evidence
From a Field Experiment (MIT Political Sci. Research Dep't, Working Paper
No. 2011-9B, 2011), available at http://www.ohio.edu/people/paxton/webpage/
altruism/Hainmueller.pdf ("finding that a majority of surveyed consumers
claim to prefer ethically certified products over non-certified alternatives, and
to be willing to pay a price premium for such products"); see also Christopher




%3Dgooglenewswsj (reporting on the Hainmueller et al. study).
124. American Apparel is Sweatshop-Free, AMERICAN APPAREL, http://www.ameri
canapparel.net/aboutus/verticalint/sweatshopfree/ (last visited Sept. 22, 2014).
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for eating locally produced food,125 and for mechanisms like carbon offset-
ting, which allow people to offset the harmful externalities of their consump-
tion.126 New "social enterprise" corporate forms for doing business, which
combine a profit-motive with an altruistic motive, also substantiate the com-
munity centered cultural trend.127 Social enterprise companies include busi-
nesses like Toms shoes, which gives a pair of shoes to someone in need for
every pair that a consumer purchases, and Warby Parker, which does the
same for eyeglasses.128
A concern for community also connects to rising concern about the en-
vironmental costs of consumption. Consumers are rejecting industrialized ag-
riculture, which relies heavily on trucking food from far away locales to
consumers, at a great cost to the environment. The trend of buying local not
only directs spending back into the local community, but it also ensures that
food consumption does not cost too much in carbon emissions.129 After re-
cent food-related health scares (such as listeria within cantaloupes), consum-
ers want to know their food's origin.130
Although there is a touchy-feely temptation to hold up community-
based consumption as a model for positive social change, it will not solve all
of society's problems. Much of the consumer interest generated by the com-
munity and local marketing rhetoric comes from upper-class consumers.13'
Buying local organic food, referred to as "yuppie chow," may not carry any
125. Theresa Selfa & Joan Qazi, Place, Taste, or Face-to Face? Understanding
Producer-Consumer Networks in "Local" Foods Systems in Washington State,
22 AGRICULTURE & HUMAN VALUES 431, 432 (2005) (By rejecting the domi-
nant corporate food system, consumers are "disengaging from the power of
distant actors to shape their local food system.") (internal citation omitted).
126. A Greener Way to Fly, DELTA AIRLINES, http://www.delta.com/content/www/
enUS/about-delta/corporate-responsibility/carbon-emissions-calculator.html#
calc (last visited Sept. 22, 2014) (The Delta Airlines website allows consumers
to use a "carbon calculator" and then make a donation to the Nature Conser-
vancy to offset the carbon impact of a trip.); see also Ezra Rosser, Poverty
Offsetting, 6 HARV. L. & POL'Y REV. 179 (2012) (describing the socially
minded consumption trend and theorizing that there might be a demand for
mechanisms designed to offset the poverty-related harms of their
consumption).
127. Dana Brakman Reiser, Theorizing Forms for Social Enterprise, 62 EMORY L.J.
681 (2012-2013).
128. Id. at 681.
129. HALWEIL, supra note 122, at 6-7; Selfa & Qazi, supra note 125, at 432.
130. See, e.g., Jonathan Lukens, Server to Farm Table: If We Know Where Our
Fresh Food Comes From, Will We Believe That It's Really Fresh?, THE AT-
LANTIC (May 23, 2014, 8:00 AM), http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/arch
ive/2014/05/traceable-food-fresh/370903/.
131. Selfa & Qazi, supra note 125, at 432.
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actual benefit toward the food producers and lower income groups. 132 Indeed,
there are serious limitations to marketing that links consumption with altruis-
tic, community-based values. This is consumption that pats the consumer on
the back, but does not actually do anything substantive to change the struc-
tural conditions that give rise to poverty and inequality.33
Despite its flaws, community-centered culture for lawyers is important.
It may reveal a latent consumer demand for legal services aimed at helping
individuals to organize around the community and restructure their lives to
become less dependent on large-scale corporate and institutional forces. Ac-
cording to futurists like Robert Kunstler, society will move toward the end of
global trade and a greater dependence on local communities, which is how
life will soon be lived anyway, when the oil runs out. 134 The practice of law
in this apocalyptic "peak-oil" scenario might actually be quite idyllic. The
theory behind big-law (law for a globalized age) disappears and instead,
"[s]mall law firms and sole practitioners representing local businesses and
individuals would continue to serve a need, assuming that we avoid the total
breakdown of law and order."135 "Rather than big salary draws and bonuses,
lawyers may find themselves bartering their services for other goods. The
prestige of lawyers as leaders in their communities may return, as many of
the excesses leading to lawyer jokes vanish."36 This post-apocalyptic but
utopian vision of lawyering aptly describes the life of the indie lawyer of the
future.
The trend that directs energy toward local communities could be viewed
as an attempt to head off what is inevitable, if and when our resources run
out. The community-centered culture supports the notion of a new market for
lawyer services that could help people become more autonomous and less
dependent on institutions that do not send value back to the community or
local economies. For instance, there could be a demand for new private law
arrangements that would enable people to own real estate without the partici-
pation of the banking conglomerates that played a role in the recent foreclo-
sure crisis.
132. Id.
133. See Amy Schiller, Is For-Profit the Future of Non-Profit?, THE ATLANTIC
(May 21, 2014, 3:36 PM), http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2014/
05/is-for-profit-the-future-of-non-profit/371336/.
134. See generally JAMES HOWARD KUNSTLER, THE LONG EMERGENCY: SURVIVING
THE CONVERGING CATASTROPHES OF THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (2004).
135. Richardson L. Lynn, It's Not The End of the World, But You Can See It From
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b. Internet Communities
The second community-related trend involves creating new Internet
communities. 37The Internet has given rise to different kinds of social com-
munities, defined by common interests rather than by geography, which
make valuable contributions to a society.138 People can now customize their
social relations to fit them better. Instead of relying on pre-existing institu-
tions (such as schools, religious institutions, churches, the Rotary Club, etc.)
to meet one's need for social connectivity, individuals can seek out new com-
munity relationships based on subjects that interest them.139 In online com-
munities, members develop a shared repertoire and shared language,140 and
often develop "in-jokes" and specialized jargon that apply to the group's
identity.141 While some critics argue that technology has made life more
alienating and lonely,142 others argue that the Internet enables people to
"form real, consequential bonds with people [they] have never met face- to-
face-and in this world of wireless computers and mobile devices [they] can
do it nearly all the time, everywhere [they] go, we go."143
Online communities are necessary for the indie lawyer of the future to
thrive. As this author has written previously, online outlets offer a form of
community for lawyers. 144 For solo practitioners, online communities are par-
137. Some of the text in this section previously appeared in two of the author's
earlier articles: Jewel, I Can Has Lawyer?, supra note 96; and Jewel, You're
Doing It Wrong, supra note 96.
138. Henry Jenkins et al., White Paper: Confronting the Challenges of Participatory
Culture: Media Education for the 21st Century 50 (2006), available at http://di
gitallearning.macfound.org/atf/cf/%7B7E45C7E0-A3EO-4B89-AC9C-E807E l
BOAE4E%7D/JENKINSWHITEPAPER.pdf; CHAYKO, supra note 119, at
29.
139. BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS, supra note 104, at 367. One example
of a robust online community would be the some 10 million persons who play
the online game World of Warcraft. See CASTELLS, supra note 109, at xxix.
140. K. Guldberg & R. Pilkington, A Community of Practice Approach to the Devel-
opment of Non-Traditional Learners Through Networked Learning, 22 J. OF
COMPUTER ASSISTED LEARNING 159, 161 (2006).
141. One example of a shared jargon would be the term "hacker," which originated
at MIT's Tech model railroad club, but came to mean a computer "enthusiast,
... artist, tinkerer, [ ] problem solver, [and] an expert." ERIC S. RAYMOND, THE
CATHEDRAL AND THE BAZAAR xii, 4 (1999). Computer acronyms, such lol
(laugh out loud), imho (in my humble opinion), and rofl (roll on the floor
laughing) also originated as a shared vocabulary within the hacker community
but have now entered mainstream culture. See "Lol," WIKIPEDIA, http://
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/LOL (last modified Sept. 7, 2014).
142. CASTELLS, supra note 109, at 387.
143. CHAYKO, supra note 119, at 3.
144. Jewel, I Can Has Lawyer?, supra note 96, at 356-62.
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ticularly important because historically, solo practitioners and small-firm
lawyers have not had access to a peer safety net from which large-firm law-
yers benefit.145 As Leslie Levin points out, online lawyer communities for
solo practitioners provide emotional support and a sense of belonging, foster
mentoring relationships between new attorneys and more seasoned practi-
tioners, and enable a discussion of ethical issues.146 Online lawyer communi-
ties offer a digital safety net that did not previously exist, like crowd-
sourcing problems (such as needing someone to cover a court appearance).
As explained in Part Four, infra, and as this author has written before,147 the
legal community needs to value these community spaces. The legal commu-
nity should not impose broad speech restrictions on online attorney speech,
even if that speech negatively characterizes the qualifications of a judge.
3. DIY Culture
DJY culture is the third zeitgeist trend that supports indie lawyering.148
DIY culture is not new; it has its roots in 1930s automotive tinkering, ham
radio, and even 1970s computer hacking.149 Both technology and a current
cultural emphasis on individual autonomy are fueling a major resurgence of
DIY culture.150 DIY culture reflects the "anti-consumerism, rebelliousness,
and creativity of earlier DIY initiatives, supporting the ideology that people
can create rather than buy the things they want."'51 Similar to the commu-
nity-centered trend, DIY culture represents a shift from mass, industrial pro-
duction back to the small and skilled producer.152 Participatory culture
145. Gary Bauer, Addressing the Needs of Solo/Small Firm Practitioners Through
Law School Based Programs to Reduce Stress in Practice-Several Ap-
proaches, 6 T. M. COOLEY J. PRAC. & CLINICAL L. 1, 6-7 (2003).
146. Leslie C. Levin, Lawyers in Cyberspace: The Impact of Legal Listservs on the
Professional Development and Ethical Decisionmaking of Lawyers, 37 ARIZ.
ST. L.J. 589, 614-15, 616, 618 (2005) [hereinafter Levin, Lawyers in
Cyberspace].
147. Jewel, I Can Has Lawyer, supra note 96, at 356-62.
148. Dan Stangler & Kate Maxwell, DIY Producer Society, 7 INNOVATIONS: MAK-
ING IN AMERICA 3, 3-10 (2012).
149. Paul Atkinson, Do It Yourself: Democracy and Design, 19 J. OF DESIGN HIST.
1, 1-10 (2006); Dale Dougherty, The Maker Movement, 12 INNOVATIONS:
MAKING IN AMERICA 11, 11-14 (2012); Stangler & Maxwell, supra note 148,
at 6; Stacy Kuznetsov & Eric Paulos, Rise of the Expert Amateur: DIY
Projects, Communities, and Cultures, Human-Computer Interaction Institute,
1-10 (2010) (Carnegie Mellon Working Paper), available at http://www
.staceyk.org/hci/KuznetsovDIY.pdf at *l.
150. PETER H. DIAMANDIS & STEVEN KOTLER, ABUNDANCE: THE FUTURE IS BETTER
THAN You THINK 10-11 (2012).
151. Kuznetsov & Paulos, supra note 149, at 1.
152. Stangler & Maxwell, supra note 148, at 8.
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interacts with DIY culture in that DIY reflects "people's need to engage pas-
sionately with objects in ways that make them more than just consumers."153
As traditional American manufacturing has been displaced abroad, DIY
movements have the "potential to transform how we think and talk about
American manufacturing-as well as its role in the U.S. economy."154 People
are turning to the Internet to sell their DIY wares. Etsy now has 875 active
online shops, representing over $400 million dollars in goods.155 For DIY
producers seeking to sell their products, technology enables them to reach
thousands of consumers or customers. 156 Greater access to technology, like
3D printing and biological devices, means that people do not need access to
laboratories or factories; technology has severed dependence on heavy capi-
tal as a requirement to enter the market.157
DIY's cultural resurgence is another cultural trend that has people tak-
ing direct control of their lives. The ethos and energy of DIY can certainly be
harnessed by lawyers, and applied in a services context, as individual lawyers
set out to market their own hand-crafted services. The DIY movement also
demonstrates that the old rules of commerce no longer apply. Technology
provides individual producers with the capacity to capture wide swaths of
potential consumers, and they may no longer be burdened by heavy capital
outlays.
For lawyers, the DIY trend points to a latent consumer demand for legal
services to form and operate new DIY businesses. Additionally, there could
be a latent demand for legal services that would allow people to realize the
full potential of living their own DIY lifestyle. For instance, if a client has
constructed her own "off-the-grid"158 DIY home, a lawyer could be instru-
mental for a client to maneuver around a regulatory landscape originally
crafted for traditionally constructed homes.
C. Market Forces
1. The Old vs. The New
Yesterday's business model, the "Coasean" firm, relied on permanent
relationships and vertical integration as a supply and production model.159 To
153. Dougherty, supra note 149, at 12.
154. Stangler & Maxwell, supra note 148, at 3.
155. DANIEL H. PINK, To SELL IS HUMAN: THE SURPRISING TRUTH ABOUT MOVING
OTHERS 31 (2012).
156. Stangler & Maxwell, supra note 148, at 8.
157. Dougherty, supra note 149, at 13.
158. Off-Grid, http:/www.off-grid.net/about-us/ (last visited Jan. 1, 2015) (off-the-
grid refers to a self-sufficient home that does not tap into municipal or state
energy or water sources).
159. See generally R.H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386, 390-92
(1937).
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build and sell products, a company owned all the factories and materials nec-
essary, managed the marketing, and controlled the transportation and logis-
tics of distribution. Depending on their role, permanent employees were
slotted into a rigid hierarchical bureaucracy.160 In a command and control
environment, managers made and implemented decisions in top-down fash-
ion, largely insulated from the workers below.161
Modem business has moved away from the static Coasean firm model,
and is now much more fluid and bottom-up. Instead of heavy vertical integra-
tion, today's businesses employ a horizontal model for supply and production
that relies on highly adaptable network connections.162 New information
technology has led this change-using rapid information technologies, busi-
nesses can now outsource their production across geographical lines, which
creates new forms of supply chains based on flexible networks.163 To make
their products now, companies outsource manufacturing and production, tak-
ing advantage of cheaper labor outside of the United States. Additionally,
companies might not even control the means of production at all. They may
simply form a relationship with a supplier who will then use the company's
platform to sell the goods.164
As the Coasean firm fades, new forms of innovation have arisen. Tech-
nology makes it easier to complete tasks without rigid management struc-
tures. 165 Consequently, society has seen the rise of collaborative, open
production models, such as open-source computer coding.166 Although most
open-source projects fail, technology facilitates the failure that allows other
projects to succeed. In traditional Coasean firms, many projects would never
get off the ground because the risks would outweigh any potential benefits. 167
As mentioned above, technology also allows individuals to make things
that previously were only made under the direction of a large corporation.
Inexpensive tools like 3D printers have rendered factories and significant
160. SHIRKY, supra note 103, at 42.
161. Id.
162. See generally Laurel Terry, The Legal World is Flat: Globalization and its
Effect on Lawyers Practicing in Non-Global Law Firms, 28 N.W. J. INT'L L. &
Bus. 527, 541 (2008) (describing the new economy's dependence on horizontal
supply chaining); Gillian Hadfield, Producing Law for Innovation, in RULES
FOR GROWTH: PROMOTING INNOVATION AND GROWTH THROUGH LEGAL RE-
FORM (Kaufman Task Force for Law, Innovation, and Growth forthcoming
2011) (business has moved to a decentralized, open system); Hadfield, Legal
Infrastructure, supra note 13, at 6.
163. Hadfield, Legal infrastructure, supra note 13, at 6.
164. CHRIS ANDERSON, THE LONG TAIL 93 (2008 ed. Hyperion) (2006).
165. SHIRKY, supra note 103, at 21.
166. Id. at 240; RAYMOND, supra note 141, at 51.
167. SHIRKY, supra note 103, at 240; RAYMOND, supra note 141, at 245, 248-49.
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capital outlays unnecessary. Moreover, Internet selling platforms make top-
down distribution unnecessary.168
The way society does business has changed with technology, but so has
the way that markets organize themselves. As detailed in the next section,
long tail markets, the "heartbeat" economy, and the sharing economy support
a latent demand for new legal products that future lawyers might offer.
2. Long Tail Markets
In 2004, when technology journalist Chris Anderson wrote about long
tail markets for Wired magazine, the article became the most cited article the
magazine had ever printed. Anderson then turned the article into a New York
Times best-selling book.169 As Anderson explains, a long tail market is essen-
tially a market for niche products. The long tail market emerged because,
unlike a brickBand-mortar retail environment, the Internet provides busi-
nesses with unlimited shelf space and allows them to stock items that may
sell only once or twice a year.17 0 Moreover, information technology makes it
easier for people from all around the world to access these niche products.171
In the past, only "hits" dominated the blockbuster media culture. This is
because "[t]he economics of the broadcast era required hit shows-big buck-
ets-to catch huge audiences."172 For music in the 1970s and 1980s, creating
a top forty hit was the only way to ensure an audience of millions.173 Now,
because of massively decreased distribution costs and market fragmentation,
hits are no longer the only market in media. Indie musicians can now sell
their music and generate sizeable income without ever having a top-forty
hit. 174 As Anderson writes, "the hits now compete with an infinite number of
niche markets, of any size. The era of one-size-fits-all is ending and in its
place is something new, a market of multitudes."175 As distribution costs
have fallen, Internet retailers can offer thousands of products that traditional
retailers could not profitably stock.176 Many of these products have always
been available, but in our hits-oriented marketing culture, consumers have
168. See Dougherty, supra note 149, 12-13; see Strangler & Maxwell, supra note
148, at 3, 8; see PINK, supra note 155, at 31.
169. See ANDERSON, supra note 164, at 10.
170. Id. at 6-10.
171. Id. at 6.
172. Id. at 5.
173. Id. at 2.
174. See WIKIPEDIA, Deerhunter, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Deerhunter (last vis-
ited July 16, 2014) (Indie band Deerhunter has been able to capitalize from a
world-wide niche market without having a traditional "hit").
175. ANDERSON, supra note 164, at 6.
176. Id.
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had difficulty locating them.177 Now, technology makes it easy for consumers




From Dustin Luther-Relevance is at the Long End of the Tail, Rain City Guide,
http://raincityguide.com/2006/04/lO/relevance-is-at-the-long-end-of-the-tail/.
In a chart of sales statistics, products that sell only once or twice in
small numbers occupy the end of the chart, the "long tail."l79 These products
sell in small numbers, but because there are so many of these sales, they add
up to a sizeable share of the market.180 Because the Internet connects so
many thousands of consumers to a vast array of products, the long tail is
economically viable. eBay (used goods) and Google (small advertising) are
examples of successful long tail businesses.181
The way to exploit the long tail is to connect supply and demand by
introducing consumers to new products through algorithmic recommenda-
tions that are based on past purchases of like-minded consumers. By harnes-
sing the big data of e-commerce, businesses are able to drive the demand
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 10.
180. ANDERSON, supra note 164, at 9.
181. Id. at 10.
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further into the long tail.182 This author agrees with law futurist Richard Suss-
kind-there may be latent long tail markets for law.183 There is a way for
lawyers to access latent long tail niche markets for unique legal services. But,
as argued in Part Four of this article, to do so, lawyers must be free from the
"tyranny of geography"184 that limits lawyer access to the market for legal
services to just one state. When potential customers are spread too thin, the
effect is the same as no customers at all.185 Moreover, to connect consumers
to niche legal services, lawyers must be able to generate robust consumer
demand. That requires loosening the ethical standards that prohibit lawyers
from directly soliciting clients.
The other trend that has fueled long tail markets is increasing demand
for individualized bespoke products that fit one's unique tastes.186 The next
section addresses this trend.
3. The Heartbeat Economy
The participatory culture of the Internet has stoked consumer demand
for highly individualized products; this demand has aligned with innovative
production and distribution models brought about by new technology.87 Fu-
turist Peter Day labeled this trend the "heartbeat economy" in a provocative
article for the BBC News service.188 Other analysts have described this trend
as "mass customization."189 "Consumers are now able to mix their own ce-
182. Id. at 55.
183. SUSSKIND, THE END OF LAWYERS, supra note 12, at 235 ("In law, as elsewhere,
there seems to be a 'long tail' of demand that has not been satisfied by the
working practices of the past.").
184. ANDERSON, supra note 164, at 17, 162.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 11.
187. See, e.g., Terry O'Reilly, Have It Your Way: How Mass Customization is
Changing Marketing, Under The Influence, CBC RADIO (Mar. 1, 2014), http://
www.cbc.ca/undertheinfluence/season-3/2014/03/01/have-it-your-way-how-
mass-customization-is-changing-marketing-l/; see also Arlene Weintraub, Is
Mass Customization the Future of Retail?, ENTREPRENEUR.COM (Nov. 12,
2013), http://www.entrepreneur.com/article/229869 (providing further support
for the shift towards customization in the marketplace).
188. Peter Day, Imagine a World Without Shops or Factories, BBC NEWS MAG.
(Oct. 10, 2013), http://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-2399021 1.
189. See, e.g., O'Reilly, supra note 187; see also Elizabeth Spaulding & Christopher
Perry, Having It Their Way: The Big Opportunity in Personalized Products,
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real [ ], design their own shoes [], and shop for artwork that fits an exact
space."190
With the older mass production model, customers had little choice about
items they could purchase.191 Henry Ford famously declared that his custom-
ers could have "any colour he wants as long as it is black."192 Under the old
"Fordist" model, "customers were interesting to the corporations only to the
extent [that] they [c]ould buy what the businesses could supply."193 Just as
the Fordist production model migrated to the developing world to capitalize
on its cheap labor, older production models are being replaced with some-
thing else.194 Day predicts that to remain competitive, western companies
may need to abandon the mass-market model and commit to fulfilling spe-
cific customer orders with the utmost speed and efficiency.195
Consumers have rejected their old role as passive consumers, and now
demand much more choice. 196 "[Contemporary] customers don't want a
choice. They want exactly what they want."197 In this era of hypercommodi-
tization of retail markets, uniqueness and exclusivity have immense market
value.198 As Chris Anderson writes:
Our growing affluence has allowed us to shift from being bargain
shoppers buying branded (or even unbranded) commodities to be-
coming mini-connoisseurs, flexing our taste with a thousand little
indulgences that set us apart from others. We now engage in a
host of new consumer behaviors that are described with intention-
ally oxymoronic terms: "massclusivity," "silvercasting," mass
customization.199
Smartphones exemplify this trend-no two smart phones are alike; they
are all individually customized by the user.200 3D printing is another example
of the "heartbeat economy."2o 3D printers allow producers to veer from the
mass production model and make inexpensive bespoke items, like prosthetic
190. Weintraub, supra note 187.
191. See Day, supra note 188, at 2.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 5.
194. See id. at 2, 5.
195. See id. at 5.
196. See id.
197. Day, supra note 188, at 5 (quoting Joe Pine).
198. See Hracs et al., supra note 2, at 1150.
199. ANDERSON, supra note 164, at 10.
200. Day, supra note 188, at 6-7.
201. Id.
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devices.202 For the past 100 years, mass production was considered the best
way to make things; hand-crafted items were usually dismissed as novelty
items.203 Now, "[w]e are about to see a real awakening of this idea of unique
products of all kinds."204
The heartbeat economy also links to the long tail niche markets concept.
As technology makes it possible to create inexpensive bespoke products, pro-
ducers can now capture the demand from those "millions of markets [with]
dozens of consumers," rather than being dependent upon "dozens of markets
[with] millions of consumers."205 Day posits that service industries will tap
into the heartbeat economy next, but admits that he is uncertain as to how.206
Although many of the entrants into the customization market have been
global businesses operating on a mass scale, a strong indie version of the
trend is percolating up.207 Just as mass retailers invite customization, indie
fashion designers hold "cocreation" workshops, inviting consumers to par-
ticipate in the production process. 08 At these workshops, consumers pay a
fee for the materials and guidance to construct their own clothing.209
Consumer demand for indie craft and artisanal products can also be seen
in the rise of Etsy, a website that enables individual producers to sell their
wares.2 10 Sales on Etsy have reached over $400 million, with over 875,000
active shops.211 Consumer demand for exclusive hand-crafted products taps
into a number of non-economic desires.212 In these transactions, neither a low
price nor convenience is the determinative factor.213 Again, as a reaction to
"hypercommoditization," individuals are motivated to consummate
202. See id.
203. See id.
204. Id. (quoting Scott Sumitt, CEO of Bespoke Innovations, a 3d printing company
making prosthetic devices).
205. Id. at 6 (quoting Joe Kraus, founder of excite@home).
206. See Day, supra note 188.
207. See Hracs et al., supra note 2, at 1151-56 (describing how indie producers
leverage exclusivity and individuality to generate demand for their products);
see also Spaulding & Perry, supra note 189 (examples of mass customization
and the effects the internet has had on creation of this consumer trend); see
generally O'Reilly, supra note 187 (examples of mass customization on a
global scale).
208. See Hracs et al., supra note 2, at 1152 (The cocreation trend can also be seen in
music, where musicians interact directly with fans to schedule small "salon"
shows, rather than playing at large concert venues.).
209. See id.
210. PINK, supra note 155, at 31.
211. Id.
212. Hracs et al., supra note 2, at 1150-51.
213. Id.
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purchases "by the conquest of distance, obstacles and difficulties."214 The
allure of these products might also be explained by a kind of nostalgia for "a
more materially substantive past."215 The desire for individuality in a mass
landscape also compels "sophisticated consumers to avoid or subvert the
mainstream" and make "one-of-a-kind," handcrafted purchases.216
The big question is whether the trend toward exclusivity and uniqueness
can be applied to the legal services market. Can lawyers generate a desire,
not solely motivated by economics, for exclusive and individualized legal
products? The thesis here is that they can. To a certain extent, technology has
not dissolved all demand for a craft-oriented approach to services.17 For in-
stance, graphic design is a craft-oriented service for which people are still
willing to pay, even though one can easily make a logo with inexpensive
software.218 The thesis here is that there is latent demand for legal products,
particularly for private-law, transactional arrangements that will enable con-
sumers to radically reorganize their lives and move from an exclusivity/own-
ership model to a sharing model. This brings up the concept of the sharing
economy, the next relevant market trend.
4. The Sharing Economy
Technology has also enabled the "sharing economy," a new form of
commerce where users harness technology in ways that allow them to mone-
tize surplus value under their control.219 In 2004, Yochai Benkler predicted
the emerging sharing economy and conceptualized "shareable goods," or
goods with excess capacity, which can be harnessed through sharing rela-
tions.220 According to Benkler, examples of this new mode of exchange in-
clude traditional carpooling and SETI@Home, where users pool excess
computer processing power to scan space for the presence of extraterrestri-
214. Id.
215. Susan Luckman, The Aura of the Analogue in a Digital Age, 19 CULTURAL
STUD. REV. 249, 255 (2013) (citation omitted).
216. Hracs et al., supra note 2, at 1151.
217. See Luckman, supra note 215, at 253-54.
218. See Hracs et al., supra note 2, at 1148-49.
219. See Matthew Boesler, The Rise of the Renting and Sharing Economy Could
Have Catastrophic Ripple Effects, BUSINESS INSIDER (Aug. 12, 2013), availa-
ble at http://www.businessinsider.com/rise-of-the-renting-and-sharing-econ-
omy-2013-8?op=l; see also Evgeny Morozov, The Sharing Economy
Undermines Workers' Rights, THE FINANCIAL TIMES, (Oct. 14, 2013), available
at http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/92c3021c-34c2-1 Ie3-8148-00144feab7de
.html#axzz3DsGFCpZG (the sharing economy helps people realize income
from surplus assets).
220. See Benkler, Sharing Nicely, supra note 93, at 275-76.
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als.221 Benkler further theorized that the sharing economy would not rely on
traditional top-down management structures, but rather would manage itself
via a decentralized, community-based, norm-enforcement system. 222 Benkler
believed that sharing communities would police themselves through three
mechanisms: (1) repeat interactions would incentivize cooperation; (2) the
wide diffusion of information would help reduce risk and predict future be-
havior; and (3) members of the community would collectively discourage
anti-social behavior.223
Benkler was right: "[s]ocial sharing and exchange [have become] com-
mon modalit[ies] of producing valuable desiderata at the very core of the
most advanced economies-in information, culture, education, computation,
and communications sectors."224 Services like Lyft225 and Uber226 allow indi-
viduals with vehicles to make extra income by giving others a ride. Air BnB
allows individuals to rent out their excess residential space to other users, 227
and TaskRabbit228 enables individuals to use their surplus time and transpor-
tation resources to run errands for others.
The sharing economy increases demand as people realize that non-ex-
clusive sharing or renting arrangements allow them to enjoy and use property
without spending beyond their means.229 For example, Forbes estimated that
the sharing economy generated $3.5 billion dollars in income in 2013 for
users. 230 The sharing economy also has the potential to generate new markets
for legal services. By using technology, lawyers may capture long tail mar-
kets, generate demand for individualized legal products, and tap into the
sharing economy. However, lawyers must first consider the potential dark
side to the sharing economy.
221. Id. at 275.
222. See id. at 320, 333.
223. See id. at 333.
224. Id. at 278.
225. LYvvr, https://www.lyft.com (last visited Sept. 15, 2014).
226. UBER, https://www.uber.com (last visited Sept. 15, 2014).
227. AIRBNB, https://www.airbnb.com (last visited Sept. 15, 2014).
228. TASKRABBIT, https://www.taskrabbit.com (last visited Sept. 15, 2014).
229. Boesler, supra note 219.
230. Tomio Geron, Arbnb and the Unstoppable Rise of the Share Economy, FORBES
(Jan. 23, 2013), available at http://www.forbes.com/sites/tomiogeron/2013/01 /
23/airbnb-and-the-unstoppable-rise-of-the-share-economy.
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5. The Sharing Economy v. Disruption, Innovation, Creativity
and Social Harm
The dark side of technological disruption is that it eliminates jobs, par-
ticularly jobs toward the bottom of the workforce hierarchy.231 That means
much fewer non-skilled jobs for ordinary workers.232 This also means fewer
jobs for lawyers because new technology products like LegalZoom reduce
the pie available for solo practitioners.233 Moreover, few individuals tend to
win during any disruption in the market. In the tech sector, vast rewards go to
a few extraordinary workers, such as inventors of successful apps. 234 Like-
wise, in the legal sector, the winners are the individuals who start successful
law-tech businesses like legal zoom. 235 The end result is expanding income
inequality in all market segments, including the legal profession. Thus, while
the mainstream media valorizes the disruption of old industries, globalized
commerce has harmed workers immensely. As labor becomes more and more
casualized, the idea of going to work and having a life-long "career" is out of
reach of many of today's workers.236 Some perceive that companies that des-
ignate themselves as sharing economy companies, such as car-pooling com-
panies like Lyft and Uber, are particularly exploit their providers.237 One
view is that companies like Lyft and Uber seek profits for shareholders and
high salaries for management by charging excessive fees to the drivers who
are trying to earn extra money in their free time.238 This segment of the shar-
ing economy, along with other forms of contingent labor arrangements, con-
231. See Alan S. Blinder, How Government Wages War on the Poor, WALL ST. J.
(Jan. 13, 2014), available at http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB 100014240
52702304049704579316510443605886; see generally TIMOTHY NOAH, THE
GREAT DIVERGENCE: AMERICA'S GROWING INEQUALITY CRISIS AND WHAT WE
CAN Do ABOUT IT 7 (2012) (generally describing the widening income gap
between those who hold college degrees and those who do not).
232. See Blinder, supra note 231.
233. See BARTON, supra note 12, at 8, 124 (explaining that between the 1980s and
now, solo practitioners have experienced a 37% decline in real income and
theorizing that the trend will only get worse as services like Legal Zoom take a
greater hold in the market for legal services).
234. See generally Blinder, supra note 231 (describing the reduction in "ordinary
jobs" that resulted from e-commerce).
235. See BARTON, supra note 12, at 19 (describing a "winner take all" paradigm for
disruption in the legal industry).
236. See generally Don Peck, How a New Jobless Era Will Transform America, THE
ATLANTIC (Mar. 2010), available at http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/arch
ive/2010/03/how-a-new-jobless-era-will-transform-america/307919.
237. See Morozov, supra note 219.
238. Thomas Frank, TED Talks Are Lying To You, SALON.COM (Oct. 13, 2013),
http://www.salon.com/2013/10/13/tedtalks-are-lying-to-you/.
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tributes to the erosion of full-time employment and health benefits for
employees.239
The optimistic rhetoric regarding innovation and creativity is also disin-
genuous at times. Thomas Frank argues that the rhetoric about creativity and
innovation, commonly seen in TED talks, is not really about creativity; but
rather represents a kind of "professional consensus."40 The rhetoric of dis-
ruptions, creativity, and innovation is really:
the story of brilliant people, often in the arts or humanities, who
are studied by other brilliant people, often in the sciences, finance,
or marketing. The readership is made up of . . . members of the
professional-managerial class[,] each of whom harbors a powerful
suspicion that he or she is pretty brilliant as well.241
Another problem is the rhetoric that touts worker autonomy in the shar-
ing economy. According to this rhetoric, all workers are "self-employed en-
trepreneurs who must think like brands."242 Members of the managerial class
gain a cause for celebration, but this is a hollow platitude. The rhetoric masks
the fact that other people, high above these working "entrepreneurs," are
profiting off of workers' excess labor and surplus space. Evgeny Morozov
calls this rhetorical sleight of hand "neoliberalism on steroids."243
Moreover, what normative values underlie innovation, creativity, and
disruption? Harvard Business School professor Clayton M. Christensen
originated the term "disruptive innovation," and defined it as selling a lower
quality product that initially reaches less profitable customers but eventually
takes over and devours an entire industry.244 Companies that merely focus on
"sustaining innovation" will lose out as the disrupting upstarts overtake the
incumbents' market share.245 Christensen's theory influences many powerful
circles, including legal circles.246 Disruption innovation theory explains that,
239. Id.
240. Frank, supra note 238 (citing MIHALY CSIKSZENTMIHALYI, CREATIVITY: FLOW
AND DISCOVERY OF INVENTION 31 (1996).
241. Id.
242. Morozov, supra note 219.
243. See id.
244. CLAYTON M. CHRISTENSEN, THE INNOVATOR'S DILEMMA xviii, xx (reprt. ed.,
Harper Business 2011) (2003).
245. Id. at xvii-xx.
246. See BARTON, supra note 12, at 6-7, 125-43 (applying Christensen's theory to
the legal services market); Frank Pasquale, Disruption: A Tarnished Brand,
CONCURRING OPINIONS (June 19, 2014), available at http://www.concurring
opinions.com/archives/2014/06/disruption-a-tarnished-brand.html (remarking
that "I've been hearing for years that law needs to be 'disrupted."').
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for some, the ascension of LegalZoom as a market player is taking over the
"bread and butter" business of many solo practitioners.247
In a recent New Yorker article, Harvard history professor Jill Lepore
sharply criticizes Christensen's disruption theory.248 Lepore argues that
Christensen's data is too thin to support using disruption as a viable business
planning theory.249 For instance, in analyzing the disk-drive industry that
Christensen studied, Lepore points out that those manufacturing firms that
remained committed to "sustaining innovation" through "incremental im-
provements" survived, "whether or not they were the first to market the dis-
ruptive new format."250
Although Lepore's arguments concerning the viability of disruption as a
predictive business model are open to debate,251 Lepore also levels a power-
ful normative argument. Lepore criticizes disruption innovation theory for
urging rapid change without pausing to consider the public good.252 In other
words, disruptive innovation can come at a tremendous social cost. For in-
stance, in the late 1990s and 2000s, the financial services industry engaged in
innovative disruption by selling subprime mortgages, collateralized debt obli-
gations, and mortgage-backed securities.253 Contrary to Christensen's theory,
Canada's TD Bank, which failed to participate in the market for subprime
mortgages and instead focused on sustainable innovation, became "one of the
247. See BARTON, supra note 12, at 6-7, 125-43 (explaining that Christensen's dis-
ruption theory predicts that mass systemized legal products like Legal Zoom
has displaced the bread and butter work of solo practitioners and will continue
to eat into this market sphere).
248. See Jill Lepore, The Disruption Machine: What the Gospel of Innovation Gets




251. See Drake Bennett, Clayton Christensen Responds to New Yorker Takedown of
'Disruptive Innovation', BLOOMBERG BusINEssWEEK, June 20, 2014, available
at http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2014-06-20/clayton-christensen-re
sponds-to-new-yorker-takedown-of-disruptive-innovation#p3 (In this article,
Professor Christensen charges Lepore with academic dishonesty on account
that others have argued all of Lepore's criticisms before. In response to Le-
pore's pointed criticism that Christensen unsuccessfully used his theory to pre-
dict future trends (i.e., Christensen did not believe the iPhone would be a
successful disruptive device) Christensen responded that his theory is con-
stantly evolving, responding to past mistakes in judgment).
252. Lepore, supra note 248.
253. Id.
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strongest banks in the world."254 But, "[w]hen the financial services industry
disruptively innovated, it led to a global financial crisis."55
In questioning the normative value of disruption theory, Lepore has cap-
tured a zeitgeist moment, seizing upon the "pervasive anger at the corporate
and political classes that used the theory of disruptive innovation to justify an
endless procession of company downsizings and closings over the past thirty
years."256 The legal profession should consider the human cost, to individual
lawyers and to clients, of innovation and disruption in law. Legal profession-
als should also theorize sustaining models of innovation for legal services
that do not necessarily require a lessening of quality. As the author has writ-
ten before, the idea that corporate legal clients are entitled to a Mercedes
lawyer while others can make do with the innovative and disruptive Toyota
Camry lawyer,257 insults both lawyers and clients alike. Christensen's model
might accurately describe market mechanisms, but the model falls short as a
professional framework for how lawyers should serve their clients.
6. A Possible Utopian Silver Lining
Technology may still help individuals improve their livelihood in a way
that does not fall into a winner-takes-all pattern of inequality, despite the
social harm that runs in tandem with market disruption. A more cynical view
is that the current structure of business will not change. The golden age that
lasted from the 1950s to 1970s, before outsourcing, contingent labor arrange-
ments, and technological advances, will not return. 258 Law practice will also
not return to a time period lasting from the 1960s to the 1990s, when both big
law firms and solo practitioners enjoyed rising incomes.259 If this is accurate,
then perhaps the legal profession should consider how to make the best of a
bad situation.
Amidst the harsh reality of this new normal, individuals can harness
new market and cultural forces to create alternative social and transactional
arrangements. For instance, even with the potential for harmful excess within
254. Id.
255. Id.
256. Michael Meranze & Chrisopher Newfield, Christensen's Disruptive Innovation
after the Lepore Critique, REMAKING THE UNIVERSITY (June 22, 2014), http://
utotherescue.blogspot.co.uk/2014/06/christensens-disruptive-innovation.html?
m=1.
257. Lucille A. Jewel, Tales of a Fourth Tier Nothing, A Response to Brian
Tamanaha's Failing Law Schools, 38 J. LEGAL PROFESSION 125, 129-30
(2013) (citing George B. Shepherd, Defending the Aristocracy: ABA Accredita-
tion and the Filtering of Political Leaders, 12 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y,
2003, at 637, 658 [hereinafter Jewel, Tales of a Fourth Tier Nothing].
258. See BARTON, supra note 12, at 55-58 (referring to a time when partners in law
firms and profits were increasing).
259. See id.
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the sharing economy, it is still worth considering whether aspects of the shar-
ing economy can foster community and improve the lives of stakeholders
involved in the enterprise. To avoid the excess harms that come from the
over-commercialization of sharing economic principles, the profession might
consider limiting the definition of the sharing economy. Janelle Orsi, the
sharing economy lawyer profiled in the next section, argues for envisioning a
sharing economy as:
[encompassing] a broad range of activities, including worker co-
operatives, neighborhood car-sharing programs, housing coopera-
tives, community gardens, food cooperatives, and renewable
energy cooperatives. These activities are tied together by a com-
mon means (harnessing the existing resources of a community)
and a common end (growing the wealth of that community). The
sharing economy is the response to the legacy economy where we
tend to be reliant on resources from outside of our communities,
and where the work we do and the purchases we make mostly
generate wealth for people outside of our communities. The rich
are still getting richer, and the sharing economy can reverse
that.260
Thus, for Orsi, the sharing economy may not include typical capitalistic
companies that employ exploitive means to generate large shareholder profits
and executive pay. With this definition in mind, consider whether there are
roles for lawyers in the sharing economy and whether lawyers might ignite
demand for bespoke legal services in niche markets.
III. THE INDIE LAWYER OF THE FUTURE
A. The Solo Practitioner of the Past
Before peering into the world of future indie lawyers, consider the dom-
inant image of solo practitioners.261 Solo practitioners are usually portrayed
as lowly members of the profession, who are afflicted with an almost innate
inability to comply with ethical rules and norms.262 Jerome Carlin, a sociolo-
gist who conducted two formative studies of lawyers in the 1960s writes:
260. Janelle Orsi, The Sharing Economy Just Got Real, SHARABLE (Sept. 16, 2013),
http://www.shareable.net/blog/the-sharing-economy-just-got-real.
261. See, e.g., CARLIN, LAWYERS ON THEIR OWN, supra note 6, at xv.
262. See id. (discussing solo practitioners are still, in 1994, "least able to conform to
ethical and professional standards"); see also Fred C. Zacharias, What Lawyers
Do When Nobody's Watching: Legal Advertising as a Case Study on the Im-
pact of Underenforced Professional Rules, 87 IOWA L. REV. 971, 1006 (2002)
(explaining solo practitioners are often associated with advertising, which is
seen as reflecting poorly upon the profession) [hereinafter Zacharias, What
Lawyers Do When Nobody's Watching]; Levin, Professional Development of
Solo and Small Firm Practitioners, supra note 6, at 847-48, 851 (discussing
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Finding himself on the lowest rung of the status ladder of the pro-
fession, with little or no chance of rising, his practice is restricted
to the least remunerative and least desirable matters-to the dirty
work of the profession, and beset by competition from lawyers
and laymen alike, the individual practitioner is frequently a dissat-
isfied, disappointed, resentful, angry man.2 63
Solo practitioners have long borne the brunt of class bias and elitism within
the legal profession. Now is the time to remodel the image of the solo practi-
tioner in America.
In his 1976 classic, Unequal Justice, Lawyers and Social Change in
Modern America, Jerome Auerbach linked the creation of the ABA's 1908
Canons of Ethics (the first of the ABA's model ethics standards) to elite
lawyers' xenophobic and racist animus toward solo practitioners, fueled by
fear of "other" lawyers that primarily consisted of immigrant solo practition-
ers.264 At this time, elite lawyers feared that too many foreign lawyers vied
for entry into the profession.65 These elites criticized foreign lawyers, and
other aspiring lawyers, for not being "from Anglo-Saxon stock [and not] hav-
ing the faintest apprehension of the nature of our institutions, or their history
and development."266
In 1908, members of the ABA perceived a conflict between respectable
lawyers who could maintain the "pristine glory" of the profession and a new
class of lawyers that allegedly demoralized the profession on account of their
"eager quest[s] for lucre."267 As a result, the ABA committee charged with
promulgating the first ethics code proposed canons to ban both advertising
and direct solicitation to change the conduct of solo practitioners.268
Auerbach argued that the 1908 Canons of Ethics "concealed class and ethnic
hostility," even though the primarily White Anglo Saxon Protestant (WASP),
ABA rule-makers attempted to insulate themselves from the "ethically con-
taminating influences.269 These "ethically contaminating influences" included
new urban solo practitioner lawyers from primarily Jewish, Catholic, or non-
that solo practitioners receive significantly less income and substantially more
discipline than their big firm colleagues); see generally JEROLD S. AUERBACH,
UNEQUAL JUSTICE, LAWYERS AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN MODERN AMERICA 40
(1976) (explaining at the beginning of the 20th century, elite lawyers despised
the influx of immigrant solo practitioners and viewed them as defiling the
profession).
263. CARLIN, LAWYERS ON THEIR OWN, supra note 6, at 73.
264. AUERBACH, supra note 262, at 40-41, 51.
265. See id. at 121.
266. Id.
267. See id. at 40-41.
268. Id. at 42-43.
269. Id. at 50.
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WASP backgrounds.270 The Anglo lawyers who populated the rule-making,
ethics committees seriously differed from the class of lawyers subject to the
rules.271 Taking no prisoners, Auerbach trenchantly exposed the extreme bi-
ases that shaped the American legal profession's ethics and norms. 272 Bald-
faced bias certainly played a role in shaping the culture of the legal profes-
sion, but it is also probable that the process of promulgating the 1908 Canons
was more nuanced than Auerbach presented it.273 The negative image of solo
practice that Auerbach documented still endures. Today, the dominant view
is that solo practitioners occupy the bottom rungs of the legal profession.274
In 1975, after studying the Chicago Bar, John P. Heinz and Edward 0.
Laumann described the legal profession as encompassing two hemispheres
with a definite hierarchical structure.2 75 The hemispheres consisted of solo
practitioners on one side with corporate big business lawyers on the other.276
In 1995, when they updated the study, they found the two hemispheres en-
dured.277 Heinz and Laumann's Chicago Bar studies offer impeccable data
and analysis, as well as a clear, hierarchical framing. Solo practitioners are at
the bottom and corporate lawyers are at the top.
Many argue that solo practitioners are less intellectually capable than
corporate lawyers because they engage in less complex legal work than law-
yers who do corporate work in a big law firm or big business setting.278 As
discussed elsewhere, this reductive dichotomy does not hold when one con-
270. AUERBACH, supra note 262, at 50.
271. Id.
272. See id.
273. See Susan D. Carle, Lawyers' Duty to Do Justice: A New Look at the History of
the 1908 Canons, 24 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 1 (1999); Susan D. Carle, How
Should We Theorize Class Interests in Thinking About Professional Regula-
tion?: The Early NAACP as a Case Example, 12 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y
571, 584-85 (2003).
274. See CARLIN, LAWYERS ON THEIR OWN, supra note 6, at xiv, 8; Levin, Profes-
sional Development of Solo and Small Firm Practitioners, supra note 6, at
847-48.
275. JOHN P. HEINZ ET AL., URBAN LAWYERS: THE NEW SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF THE
BAR 3, 6-7 (2005).
276. Id.
277. Id. at 7.
278. See, e.g., CARLIN, LAWYERS ON THEIR OWN, supra note 6; Daniel J. Morrissey,
Saving Legal Education, 56 J. LEGAL EDUC. 254, 273-75 (2006); Jewel, Tales
of a Fourth Tier Nothing, supra note 257; Randolph N. Jonakait, The Two
Hemispheres of Legal Education and the Rise and Fall of Local Law Schools,
51 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 863, 874 (2007).
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siders what corporate lawyers and solo practice lawyers actually do on a day-
to-day basis.279
Finally, solo lawyers are often viewed as unethical and sleazy, espe-
cially in contrast with lawyers working in large law firms.280 This view de-
rives, in part, from the fact that solo lawyers are disciplined at a greater rate
for ethics violations than lawyers working in larger firms281 and from the fact
that legal, and popular, culture show disdain for solo practitioners who ac-
tively seek out business through advertising.282
The unethical view of solo practitioners is likely related to the type of
work they perform. Jerome Carlin, sociologist and lawyer, characterized the
solo practitioners' work as "dirty work, the 'crap,' the 'junk' that no one else
will handle, but which the younger lawyer will often have to take if he wants
any business at all."283 Carlin further argued that:
the individual lawyer generally finds it difficult if not, in some
instances, impossible to conform to the ethical standards of prac-
tice. In his efforts to obtain business, and in his dealings with cli-
ents and various public officials, he is frequently exposed to
pressures to engage in practices contrary to the official norms....
[B]ecause he is more likely to get the dirty work the individual
lawyer is less likely to keep clean.284
For example, the character of Saul Goodman on the television show
Breaking Bad is perhaps no greater testament to how early twenty-first cul-
ture views solo practitioners. Saul Goodman is the penultimate shyster, the
279. See Jewel, Tales of a Fourth Tier Nothing, supra note 257, at 131-37.
280. See Levin, The Ethical World of Solo and Small Law Firm Practitioners, supra
note 7, at 311-12.
281. Id. at 310-13 (citing Bruce L. Arnold & Fiona M. Kay, Social Capital, Viola-
tions of Trust and the Vulnerability of Isolates: The Social Organization of Law
Practice and Professional Self Regulation, 23 INT'L J. Soc. L. 321, 337-38
(1995) (noting that solo practitioners receive the majority of professional mis-
conduct sanctions); see also Mark Hansen, Picking on the Little Guy: Percep-
tion Lingers that Discipline Falls Hardest on Solos, Small Firms, A.B.A.J.,
Mar. 2003, at 32-33 (discussing studies of attorney disciplinary actions in Cali-
fornia, New Mexico, Virginia, and Oregon that indicate a higher rate of sanc-
tion imposition against solo and small firm practitioners); Hal R. Lieberman,
How to Avoid Common Ethics Problems: Small Firms and Solos Are Often
Subject to Disciplinary Complaints and Malpractice Claims, N.Y.L.J., Oct. 28,
2002, at 20 (noting that the vast majority of New York attorneys subject to
disciplinary complaints are small firm and solo practitioners)).
282. Levin, The Ethical World of Solo and Small Law Firm Practitioners, supra
note 7, at 311-12; Zacharias, What Lawyers Do When Nobody's Watching,
supra note 262, at 1014-15.
283. CARLIN, LAWYERS ON THEIR OWN, supra note 6, at 6.
284. Id. at 92.
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lawyer who will do anything for a fee.285 Goodman embodies all the negative
stereotypes of solo practitioners in America by advertising extensively on
bus station benches, having an office in a shabby shopping center, and partic-
ipating in Walter White's descent to criminal overlord status.
Conflicting with the negative image associated with solo practitioners,
there is some evidence that solo practitioners are more satisfied and exercise
more autonomy than big firm, elite lawyers.286 Moreover, the fact that solo
practitioners receive more disciplinary complaints than lawyers who work in
larger firms does not necessarily mean that one group is less ethical.87 Large
firm lawyers are less likely to receive disciplinary complaints compared to
solo practitioners because clients of solo practitioners "have fewer mecha-
nisms for redress when their lawyers engage in wrongdoing" as opposed to
corporate clients.288
It is time to change the narrative and remodel the image of the solo
practitioner. The "indie" term in this article's title is not just a ploy for nov-
elty in the pages of a law review. For years, solo practitioners have endured
terrible public relations issues. Instead of a disdainful view, society should
emphasize that the indie lawyer chooses to work on his or her own, repre-
senting individual clients-real people with real problems, exercising more
autonomy, and enjoying far more flexibility and work-life balance than the
big law attorney. When considering new technology, new markets, and com-
munity-oriented, cultural trends, practicing law on one's own has the poten-
tial to maximize professional autonomy, make legal practice meaningful, and
improve the everyday lives of others.
B. The Indie Lawyer of the Future
The indie lawyer of the future crafts individualized legal products for
consumers who wish to reorganize their everyday personal or work lives.
The indie lawyer provides face-to-face advice and clients seek out his or her
professional wisdom. The indie lawyer's legal products are mostly private
285. BREAKING BAD (AMC 2008).
286. Levin, Preliminary Reflections on the Professional Development of Solo and
Small Firm Practitioners, supra note 6, at 848, 896 ("It appears that the typical
solo or small firm practitioner who represents the middle-class client is not the
undereducated and disillusioned lawyer who Carlin described forty years ago,
but rather someone who often has chosen that form of practice and is generally
satisfied with it."); see also HEINZ ET AL., supra note 275, at 118 (describing
survey results where 87% of solo practitioners reported freedom of control over
their work product while only 58% of lawyers practicing in firms of 31-99
lawyers and 59% of lawyers practicing in firms with more than 100 lawyers
reported this level of autonomy).
287. Levin, The Ethical World of Solo and Small Law Firm Practitioners, supra
note 7, at 314.
288. Id.
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law transactional documents that allow people to share real and personal
property, share services, or create alternative transactions to eliminate reli-
ance on corporate institutions.
Driving potential demand for these products is cost of living, which in-
creases as the costs of transportation, housing, childcare, and higher educa-
tion increase.289 Concurrent with increases in the cost of living, there is
greater precarity in work, with more contingent and temporary work arrange-
ments and an expansion of low paying service jobs that offer little room for
growth.290 If Herman Daly's admonition that society should focus on more
development and less growth291 is accepted, then the legal profession should
craft legal products to allow people to do more with less. Traditionally, pri-
vate law products have only benefited the very well-off. For instance, em-
ployment agreements provide security and certainty that benefit only high-
level executives and those professors who are tenured or on a tenure-track.92
On the other hand, most ordinary people work in a highly precarious at-will
employment situation.
If and when individuals turn toward a less competitive notion of work
and business, traditional employment hierarchies are challenged, and a mar-
ket emerges for alternative legal arrangements, such as cooperatives and low-
profit organizations. These alternative organizations would engage in com-
merce. Instead of adopting an owner-take-all structure, the purpose of run-
ning the alternative business is to enable all of its employees to earn a living
wage. The legal services required to create these new organizational forms
represent a new market, because unlike will or lease products, such as those
offered by LegalZoom,293 inexpensive individualized private law documents
do not exist in today's marketplace.
There is a potential demand for dispute resolution services that are held
either face-to-face or by using cheap and accessible conferencing technology
like Skype, even though most legal services in a community-centered sharing
economy are transactional in nature. 294 Despite criticism for the disruption
concept earlier in this paper, community-centered indie lawyering can over-
lap with disruptive technology. For instance, Wevorce combines individual-
ized lawyering, family counseling, and technology to help individuals turn a
289. See NOAH, supra note 231, at 50.
290. See id. at 50-54.
291. See HERMAN DALY, THE ECONOMICS OF SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 65-70,
228-30 (1996).
292. Saru Matambanazo, Untitled Manuscript (Tulane Univ. School of Law) (on file
with author).
293. LEGALZOOM, http://www.legalzoom.com/ (last visited Sept. 17, 2014).
294. See BARTON, supra note 12, at 148-50.
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contested divorce into an easy, inexpensive, non-contested, pro se divorce.295
Wevorce shares some of the attributes of the indie lawyer model because the
service uses both individual lawyers and parenting experts. Thus, Wevorce
combines an individualized bespoke approach with Internet-driven forms.
This hybrid model has potentialuses in in other court system contexts, such
as bankruptcy.
A few lawyers out there actually exemplify the indie lawyer model. The
most visible of these lawyers is Janelle Orsi. Orsi both maintains a law prac-
tice296 in Berkeley, California and runs the nonprofit Sustainable Economies
Law Center (SELC).297 In 2012, Orsi published Practicing Law in the Shar-
ing Economy, which documents her approach to practicing law.298 Despite its
revolutionary content, Orsi's book has received little attention from legal
academics.
Orsi writes "transaction lawyers are needed, en masse, to aid in an epic
reinvention of our economic system."299 She predicts that:
Every community in the United States will soon need sharing
economy lawyers, grassroots transactional lawyers, or whatever
you may prefer to call these new legal specialists. With around
30,000 incorporated towns and cities in the United States, we will
soon need at least 100,000 sharing economy lawyers. And as the
sharing economy becomes the predominant economic force in our
society, then all transactional lawyers in the United States (ap-
proximately 500,000) should consider transforming the focus of
their practices to smooth the way toward a more sustainable econ-
omy. No matter how you do the math, the sharing economy offers
a huge opportunity to new and experienced lawyers alike.300
Orsi argues sharing economies give rise to collaborative transactions
that do not fit within existing buyer/seller, landlord/tenant, or employer/em-
ployee relationships; thus, the need for specialized sharing economy law-
yers.30' In a sharing economy, many of these traditional categories overlap
and lose their mutually exclusive character.302 The sharing economy needs
295. WEVORCE, http://www.wevorce.com/about.htm (last visited Sept. 19, 2014);
BARTON, supra note 12, at 148-50.
296. LAW OFFICE OF JANELLE ORSi, http://www.janelleorsi.com/ (last visited Sept.
19, 2014).
297. SUSTAINABLE COMMUNITIES LAW CENTER, http://www.theselc.org (last visited
Sept. 19, 2014).
298. ORSI, PRACTICING LAW IN THE SHARING ECONOMY, supra note 122.
299. Id. at 1.
300. Id. at 2.
301. See id. at 13.
302. Id. at 14.
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lawyers to mold legal arrangements, encompass new thinking, create new
categories, and even develop new modes of regulation where traditional cate-
gorical lines are shifted and modulated.303 For instance, employment law is
generally designed to strike a power balance between employers and employ-
ees, but in alternative work arrangements, like a cooperative, everyone is an
owner and a worker. This creates the potential for mismatch with existing
employment law regulations.304
This new type of lawyer is "essentially a transactional lawyer that fo-
cuses on the needs of the communities and enterprises developing within the
new economy."305 The skills required of a sharing lawyer include: the ability
to recognize and manipulate legal categories and boundaries; to build up new
forms from scratch (rather than working from boilerplate forms); to facilitate
and mediate disputes; and to understand and counsel on the risks of
litigation.306
Orsi's brand of lawyer is more cooperative than adversarial, which goes
against the grain of dominant legal culture. 307 Law students are also some-
what unprepared for becoming sharing lawyers because law schools focus
analysis on existing doctrine, with little emphasis on creating novel legal
frameworks or "pav[ing] new ways." 308 If this sharing model of lawyering
takes off, then legal education should shift to accommodate it.
Although traditional legal instruction does not develop all the skills
needed for practicing law in the sharing economy, Michigan State College of
Law's Reinvent Law Laboratory is an exception. Founded by forward-think-
ing professors Renee Knake and Daniel Martin Katz, Reinvent Law's im-
pressive compendium of courses encourages students to develop innovative
and disruptive legal services products.309 Many Reinvent Law students work
on traditional projects that focus on big data, the large-scale computerized
delivery of unbundled legal services, as well as logistical approaches to prod-
uct management at large law firms. But some Reinvent Law students are
taking a more indie path, pursuing community-centered projects designed to
deliver customized legal products to individual consumers. At a recent
Reinvent Law workshop, students detailed plans to: pursue tech-enabled
practices, give legal advice to educators, help independent filmmakers struc-
ture their contracts, and give privacy law advice to computer users. One
Reinvent Law student, Karen Francis-McWhite, has a plan to provide inex-
303. See id. at 13.
304. See ORSI, PRACTICING LAW IN THE SHARING ECONOMY, supra note 122, at 13.
305. Id. at 25.
306. See id. at 25-27.
307. See id. at 22-23.
308. See id. at 30.
309. REINVENT LAW, http://www.reinventlaw.com/main.html (last visited Sept. 9,
2014).
[Vol. XVII
The Indie Lawyer of the Future
pensive legal advice designed to help individuals achieve a homesteading
lifestyle. This plan emphasizes home ownership, self-reliance, sustainable
consumption, urban farming, and generative energy practices (i.e., living off-
the-grid).310 The seeds for transforming the solo practice of law may come
from such students if these soon-to-be lawyers graduate and can kindle de-
mand by putting these ideas into practice. The indie lawyer will take off and
run. Orsi advocates that lawyers embrace entrepreneurship in an alternative
framework. Instead of an entrepreneurship model that emphasizes relentless
competition, Orsi argues that entrepreneurs "will be successful based on the
relationships they built with others, but not based on their ability to compete
with others."311 By focusing on community, resilience, and sharing, Orsi's
community-oriented vision of legal practice encompasses all of the theoreti-
cal, cultural, and market ideas discussed in this article. But the wonderful
thing about Orsi and SELC is that her theory works in practice. She is suc-
cessful in making a comfortable living from a law practice that taps into the
sharing economy. Orsi's non-profit SELC constitutes a community of like-
minded attorneys and professionals pursing the same practice goals. She il-
lustrated that sharing law is more than just an idealist theory.
For indie lawyers to thrive, they probably need to practice, as Orsi does,
in a densely populated area, ideally one with a deeply embedded progressive
worldview, where a sharing culture has already taken hold. Alternatively, the
indie lawyer could use technology to reach hundreds of potential customers
across the country via long tail legal services. However, as explained in the
next section, for a single lawyer or a small law firm to access this potential
long tail market, the ethics rules that strictly limit the multi-jurisdictional
practice of law312 must change. The next section advocates for changing the
Model Rule of Professional Responsibility 7.3(a), the ethics rule that prohib-
its lawyers from directly soliciting clients.313 To open up this new market,
lawyers must directly advocate the benefits of using law to transform individ-
uals' everyday lives. This advocacy could require a direct sales approach.
More students should not take out loans and attend law school because
of the optimism for the future of the indie lawyer. Other, more complicated
things must happen for the indie lawyer model to thrive, such as driving
down the cost of legal education. With law school debt levels hovering at
$125,000 for private law graduates and $75,700 for public law graduates,314
it is not even possible to think about forging an independent path in law
310. See generally Karen Francis-McWhite, BUILDING MIHOMESTEAD, http://www
.gofundme.com/BuildingMiHomestead (last visited Sept. 13, 2014).
311. ORSI, PRACTICING LAW IN THE SHARING ECONOMY, supra note 122, at 7 (em-
phasis in original).
312. ABA MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT, R. 5.5 (2013).
313. ABA MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT, R. 7.3 (2013).
314. Debra Cassens Weiss, Average Debt of Private Law School Grads is $125k;
It's Highest at These Five Schools, A.B.A.J. (Mar. 28, 2012), available at http:/
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without guaranteed income and no benefits. For most new graduates, the in-
die lawyer model might serve as a side-project while they also work a stan-
dard job with salary and benefits. Or, it might be something law graduates
turn to after working full time at a traditional law job. However, if more
lawyers choose an indie path, this field of lawyering could grow and lead to
the possibility of entry-level positions.
Fortunately, the indie lawyer model allows space for cheaper, alterna-
tive paths into the legal profession through the apprenticeship model.315 This
model allows students to become members of the bar after working for a
number of years in a law office. The indie lawyer movement would also
embrace lawyers with Juris Doctorites (JDs) from inexpensive (but not ABA
accredited) law schools.
Fleshing out the concept of a DLY legal education is beyond the scope
of this article, but some existing institutions support such a path. California is
perhaps best known for having several inexpensive law schools that are not
nationally accredited through the American Bar Association, such as the on-
line Concord Law School (graduates can take the California bar).316 Addi-
tionally, there are inexpensive state-accredited law schools, such as the
Nashville School of Law317 (graduates eligible for Tennessee bar member-
ship), Miles Law School,38 and Birmingham School of Law319 (graduates
eligible for Alabama bar membership). For the DIY-minded law student,
these non-mainstream schools offer a dramatically less expensive path into
the legal profession. Of course, the rampant elitism in the legal profession
means that some, possibly many, in the profession place little to no value on
these educational credentials. And the legal profession's devaluation of a
non-traditional JD could bleed into client perceptions of quality. But the
whole point of DIY culture, as applied to education, is to reject cookie-cutter
models and elitist credentialing systems.320
/www.abajoumal.com/news/article/average-debtjloadof-private-law-grads_
is_125kthesefiveschools lead to m.
315. ORSI, PRACTICING LAW IN THE SHARING ECONOMY, supra note 122, at 31-32.
316. CONCORD LAW SCHOOL, http://law.concordlawschool.edu/ (last visited Sept.
19, 2014).
317. THE NASHVILLE SCHOOL OF LAW, http://www.nashvilleschooloflaw.net/ (last
visited Sept.19, 2014).
318. MILES LAW SCHOOL, http://www.mlaw.edu/ (last visited Sept. 19, 2014).
319. BIRMINGHAM SCHOOL OF LAW, http://www.bsol.com/ (last visited Sept. 19,
2014).
320. See generally ANYA KAMENETZ, DIY U EDUPUNKS, EDUPRENEURS, AND THE
COMING TRANSFORMATION OF HIGHER EDUCATION (2010).
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C. The Relevance of the Indie Lawyer
The indie lawyer operates in small-scale niche spaces that are not yet
connected to mass consumer demand. This begs the question: what is the
relevance of studying such a small group of lawyers? The answer is that a
small group of niche actors has the capacity to induce radical societal
changes, even if they occur very slowly.321 Here, the work of Frank W.
Geels, a scholar writing about how technological innovations evolve to influ-
ence society, provides a valuable analytical framework for understanding
why niche markets are so important in a legal context.322
Geels theorized that technological change should form a multi-level per-
spective of three pathways. 323 Geels's top level is the macro socio-technical
landscape, the realm of "macro-economics, deep cultural patterns, [and]
macro-political developments."324 Geels's second meso-level is the socio-
technical regime. The socio-technical regime is made up of: (1) cognitive
routines that make professionals "look in particular directions [for solving
problems] but not others"; (2) internal norms and rules for doing things; and
(3) sunk investments (adaptations that people have made in response to par-
ticular technology, such as familiarity with a certain kind of computer inter-
face).325 Change at the socio-technical landscape and regime level can take
decades. Once technology becomes useful it becomes deeply embedded in
people's minds and in institutional structures (the socio-technical regime).
Eventually, it becomes instantiated in macro-political and institutional struc-
tures (the socio-technical landscape).326
Change happens at the third level, Geels's technological niches.327 The
niche level provides an incubation space for radical innovation to develop,
often by "small networks of dedicated actors, often outsiders or fringe ac-
tors."328 Isolation from the market is actually helpful for incubating radical
321. See Frank W. Geels & Rene Kemp, Dynamics in Sociotechnical Systems: Ty-
pology of Change Processes and Contrasting Case Studies, 29 TECH. IN Soc'v
441, 443-44 (2007) [hereinafter Geels & Kemp, Dynamics in Socio-Technical
Systems].
322. See id. at 441.
323. Frank W. Geels & Johan Schot, Typology of Sociotechnical Transition Path-
ways, 36 RESEARCH POL'v 399, 399 (2007) [hereinafter Geels & Schot, Typol-
ogy of Sociotechnical Transition Pathways].
324. Id. at 400; Geels & Kemp, Dynamics in Socio-Technical Systems, supra note
321, at 443.
325. Geels & Kemp, Dynamics in Socio-Technical Systems, supra note 321, at 443.
326. See id. at 443-44.
327. See id. at 443; Geels & Schot, Typology of Sociotechnical Transition Pathways,
supra note 323, at 400.
328. Geels & Schot, Typology of Sociotechnical Transition Pathways, supra note
323, at 400.
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innovations because "most [new] inventions are relatively crude and ineffi-
cient on the date they are first recognized as constituting a new invention.
They are, of necessity, badly adapted to many of the ultimate uses to which
they will eventually be put."329 Since they are working outside of the main-
stream and are not immediately concerned with producing large profits, niche
actors have the freedom to ignore embedded rules and improvise. Through
trial and error, they can create imaginative solutions to particular
problems.330 Once a niche technology "develops a technical trajectory of its
own and rules [for its use] begin to stabilize," more and more users will
adopt the new technology.331 Eventually, niche technologies are adopted and
accepted such that they become embedded in society's meso and macro
levels.332 Geels applied his theory to explain how the Netherlands transi-
tioned from cesspools to integrated sewer systems 333 and how Dutch waste
management transitioned from uncontrolled waste dumping to a differenti-
ated system. 334
Applying Geels's theory to law helps predict that a novel legal product
will emerge out of an indie lawyer's practice and will have the capacity to
transform how people legally structure their everyday lives. In this instance,
law and legal products are analogous to technology and technological prod-
ucts. For example, property arrangements that are founded upon collective
sharing principles (rather than atomistic ownership rights) may prove effec-
tive in the small-scale niche setting. These arrangements have the capacity to
eventually influence large-scale legal structures. Understandably, the indie
lawyer's radical innovations may not immediately get adopted. They conflict
with entrenched ways of practicing law-the cognitive structures, routines,
contract boilerplate, and consumer expectations upon which our legal infra-
structure is based. Nonetheless, once enough lawyers and clients adopt and
use these new legal arrangements, pathways will shift and the legal system
(e.g., the category of property law) will begin to look different.
To a certain extent, Christensen's model of disruption tracks Geels's
model for technological change when applied to the legal market, but the
frame is markedly different. The legal disruptors who would package and
commoditize legal products for mass consumption are pursuing profit
payoffs, even if the initial payout is small. Unlike the mass legal retailer, the
indie lawyer is developing innovative products in a bit of vacuum. Separated
from mass demand and existing legal infrastructure, the indie lawyer can
329. Geels & Kemp, Dynamics in Socio-Technical Systems, supra note 321, at 443.
330. See id. at 443-44.
331. Id. at 444.
332. See id.
333. Id. at 446-50.
334. See Geels & Kemp, Dynamics in Socio-Technical Systems, supra note 321, at
450.
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think deeply and design radical products that might better meet the human
needs of his or her clients.
Although the indie lawyer needs to make a reasonable living, his or her
income needs are smaller than a company seeking to maximize profits for its
members or shareholders.335 This smaller need for income enables the indie
lawyer to easily incorporate social goals that may not directly align with
profit seeking into his or her practice. For example, the indie lawyer, by
virtue of his or her situation, can conceive of and execute radical solutions to
legal problems, such as drafting a home sharing agreement from scratch. A
purely capitalistic business would reject such a project for being too far re-
moved from the potential for profits. The fact that niche lawyers are discon-
nected from mass markets gives these lawyers the capacity to foster
structural legal change.
At some point, the question of disruption will arise. What is to prevent
the indie lawyer from disruption by offering a cheaper, lower-quality model
of legal services that enables sharing arrangements? If the indie lawyer is like
the DIY craft producer on Etsy, what is to prevent the law version of a mass
retailer like Urban Outfitters from invading and destroying the individual's
Etsy retail market?
This author argues that the indie lawyer should stoke the forces men-
tioned earlier in this article: (1) rising consumer demand for unique products
that can be customized;336 and (2) increasing consumer desire to engage with
community centered businesses.337 These market and cultural forces could
sustain a demand for an individual lawyer with high emotional intelligence
who offers practical wisdom to his or her clients. Although a number of the
transactional documents can be offered by services like Legal Zoom, the
cheaper alternative represents an impersonal one-size-fits-all product. For
some, lower cost will be the deciding factor. But for others, the extant desire
for the individually tailored may prevent the indie attorney from disruption
by the mass retail of legal services.
IV. REFORMING ETHICS RULES
A. Initial Thoughts on Lawyer Ethics Reforms
Several longstanding rules of professional conduct must be overhauled
for the indie lawyer of the future to thrive. The rules of professional conduct
are too restrictive to foster true innovation in the practice of law and unduly
335. The author recognizes, of course, that not all lawyers would accept a reasona-
ble income as the goal for their law practice. Many individual lawyers would
seek to maximize their income in the same way that a corporation would. But
some attorneys, such as Janelle Orsi, see their role in less capitalistic terms and
view themselves as playing a "vital role in the preservation of society." ORSI,
PRACTICING LAW IN THE SHARING ECONOMY, supra note 122, at 25.
336. See supra notes 188-218 and accompanying text.
337. See supra notes 121-136 and accompanying text.
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hamper the professional autonomy of lawyers practicing on their own. Ethics
rules are often criticized for two interconnecting harms that relate to the topic
of this article. First, overly broad ethics rules tend to dampen innovation in
legal services markets.338 Second, ethics rules tend to harm the business of
solo practitioners339 while simultaneously reinforcing hierarchy in the profes-
sion.340 Ethics rules help maintain law's professional hierarchy because they
allow elite lawyers (who do not need to directly solicit clients, for instance)
to continue to look down on solo practitioner lawyers whose livelihoods are
constricted by these rules.
In the context of legal ethics rules and innovation, the scholars refer-
enced in Part I argue for providers of legal services to better provide leverage
capital and technology to generate large profits by liberalizing legal regula-
tions. For instance, some authors argue that allowing corporations to hold
ownership interests in law firms will ameliorate the current access to justice
problem, making the delivery of legal services cheaper because corporations
can deliver services on a much larger scale than solo practitioners and small
firm lawyers.341 Other authors argue that allowing the corporate practice of
law allows law firms to receive large infusions of equity capital.342 Still
others argue that allowing non-lawyers to hold equity interests in law firms
facilitates more innovation because innovators are more likely to come from
outside, rather than inside, the legal profession.343 Finally, scholars argue that
338. E.g., Hadfield, Legal Infrastructure, supra note 13, at 55-57; James E.
Moliterno, The Trouble With Lawyer Regulation, 662 EMORY L.J. 886, 886
(2013); Bruce H. Kobayashi & Larry E. Ribstein, Law's Information Revolu-
tion, 53 ARIz. L. REV. 1169, 1169 (2011).
339. AUERBACH, supra note 262, at 43, 50-51.
340. Levin, The Ethical World of Solo and Small Law Firm Practitioners, supra
note 7, at 311-12; Zacharias, What Lawyers Do When Nobody's Watching,
supra note 262, at 1007, 1014-15.
341. See Gillian K. Hadfield, The Cost of Law: Promoting Access to Justice
Through the (Un)Corporate Practice of Law, 38 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 43, 44,
47-50 (2014) [hereinafter Hadfield, The Cost of Law]; Renee Newman Knake,
Democratizing the Delivery of Legal Services, 73 OHIO ST. L.J. 1, 6, 46 (2012)
[hereinafter Knake, Democratizing the Delivery of Legal Services] (arguing
that corporate ownership of law firms would help realize efficiencies of scale
that would engender the delivery of more legal services).
342. See Hadfield, The Cost of Law, supra note 341, at 54-55; Stephen Gillers,
What We Talked About When We Talked About Ethics: A Critical View of the
Model Rules, 46 OHIO ST. L.J. 243, 268 (1985) [hereinafter Gillers, What We
Talked About When We Talked About Ethics] (arguing that the prohibition
against non-lawyer ownership of law firms excludes a major source of capital
from law firm finances).
343. See Molitemo, supra note 338, at 107; Hadfield, Legal Infrastructure, supra
note 13, at 55-56.
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the market can regulate lawyers more effectively than an expansive ethics
code.344
There is room to criticize some of these economic arguments for less
lawyer regulation. A relentlessly economic approach tends to exclude some
important but unquantifiable factors. As James Boyd White writes, econom-
ics' neutrality:
on all questions of motive external to the acquisitive and competi-
tive ones enacted in the exchange game [rational persons acting in
their own self-interest] is to be silent on all the great questions of
human life: questions of beauty and ugliness in art and music,
sincerity and falsity in human relations, wisdom and folly in con-
duct and judgment, and on the greatest of all questions, which is
how we ought to lead our lives.345
The ethical rules need to be liberalized for reasons that deviate from a
pure market-based approach. In addition to enabling more large-scale inno-
vation, changing the ethics rules will allow individual lawyers to use technol-
ogy to connect with clients one-to-one and to deliver customized services-
but on a much larger scale than previously realized. Moreover, in terms of an
organizing principle for lawyer ethics, a community-centered ethics model,
in which community norms can help shape individual lawyer ethics, offers a
better framework than the market because the community captures more val-
ues related to the public good than a disembodied market of self-interested
actors. 346
Below are several areas within our ethics rules that should be modified
to foster indie lawyering. The rules should be changed to permit: (1) direct
solicitation, particularly for transactional services; (2) law practice across ju-
risdictions; (3) non-lawyer participation in the ownership and operation of
law firms; and (4) lawyers to speak more freely in their legal communities.
B. Direct Solicitation B Unlocking Latent Markets
Model Rule of Professional Conduct 7.3(a), which prohibits lawyers
from directly soliciting legal services, 347 needs modification to allow direct
solicitation in all forms except in circumstances involving fraud, misleading
344. Kobayashi & Ribstein, supra note 338, at 1185.
345. James Boyd White, The Language and Culture of Economics, in JUST. As
TRANSLATION 46, 58 (Univ. of Chicago ed, 1990).
346. Commons scholar Elinor Ostrom has also found that community can function
to regulate the behavior of individuals in common ownership schemes. See
supra note 92 and accompanying text.
347. Model Rule of Professional Conduct 7.3(a) provides that "[a] lawyer shall not
by in-person, live telephone or real-time electronic contact solicit professional
employment .. .when a significant motive for the lawyer's doing so is the
lawyer's pecuniary gain, unless the person contacted: (1) is a lawyer; or (2) has
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information, overreaching, or an intent to stir up frivolous litigation. Such
modifications would allow the indie lawyer to open up latent markets by
publicizing how novel legal services can help clients transform their every-
day lives by doing more with less. Indie lawyers must directly sell the bene-
fits of these services to tap into this potentially large latent market.348 Daniel
Pink's conclusion that "we're all in sales now" rings absolutely true, espe-
cially in this context.349
Lawyers need to the opportunity to stoke latent demand by explaining
the benefits of how new legal arrangements, based in the sharing economy,
can benefit potential clients. In a seminal 1980 article, William Felstiner,
Richard Abel, and Austin Sarat theorized that disputes become legal claims
through a process of perception, blame assignment, and then a decision to
enter the litigation process. 350 Arguably, the same process applies for lawyers
seeking to persuade individuals that the purchase of inexpensive but individ-
ualized private law products will help them reorder their lives for the better.
The only current exception in Rule 7.3(a) is if the solicitation is not
significantly motivated by the lawyer's quest for pecuniary gain.351 This ex-
ception derives from two Supreme Court cases decided in 1978.352 In Ohralik
v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, the Supreme Court upheld disciplining a lawyer who
directly solicited two young accident victims.353 Ohralik approached one vic-
tim while she was in the hospital lying in traction, and he approached the
other victim at her home.354 In both solicitations, he concealed a tape re-
corder that documented the conversations.355 The Supreme Court held that
Ohio's ban on direct solicitation was reasonable as a prophylactic measure. 356
In the companion case to Ohralik, In Re Primus, the Supreme Court
held that a lawyer's direct solicitation of a client was permissible if pecuniary
a family, close personal, or prior professional relationship with the lawyer."
MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT, R. 7.3(a) (2011).
348. See SUSSKIND, THE END OF LAWYERS, supra note 12, at 234 (theorizing the
existence of a latent legal market); see also Renee Newman Knake, Democra-
tizing Legal Education, 45 CONN. L. REV. 1281, 1291 (2013) ("The unmet need
for legal services must be channeled into a demand for legal services.").
349. PINK, supra note 155, at 9, 19 (Even if not officially in sales, we all spend a
great part of our day "persuading, influencing, and convincing others.").
350. William L.F. Felstiner et al., The Emergence and Transformation of Disputes:
Naming, Blaming, Claiming. .. , 15 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 631 (1980).
351. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT, R. 7.3(a) (2011) (Public Interest
Exception).
352. Id.
353. Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 467 (1978).
354. Id.
355. Id. at 450-51.
356. Id. at 464-68.
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gain was not the attorney's primary motivation.357 In In Re Primus, an ACLU
attorney sent a letter to a woman, who, in exchange for continued receipt of
government benefits, had agreed to be sterilized as part of an Aiken County,
South Carolina program to encourage sterilization.35s The letter detailed that
the ACLU offered free legal representation to women sterilized in this man-
ner.359 In this case, because the lawyer's pecuniary gain was not the primary
motivating factor of the solicitation, disciplining the lawyer was unconstitu-
tional under the First and Fourteenth Amendments.360 Rule 7.3's public inter-
est exception derives from these two cases. 361
However, a better and more workable approach would be to dispense
with the expansive prohibition. Instead, the rule should focus on the context
of the conduct and eliminate specific targeted conduct.362 The court could
still discipline Ohralik for overreaching if the rule prohibited direct solicita-
tion in circumstances involving fraud, misleading information, overreaching,
or intent to stir up frivolous litigation. In addition, a relaxed rule would open
communication channels and allow the delivery of more information about
potentially transformative legal services.
Alternatively, the courts might consider dropping the ban on direct so-
licitation for legal services that are transactional in nature to resolve the con-
cern about the overreaching aspects of direct solicitation in a litigation
context. In 1993, in Edenfield v. Fane, the Supreme Court held that a ban on
direct solicitation for certified public accountants was an unconstitutional re-
striction on speech rights.363 The Supreme Court reasoned that accountants
are different from lawyers because they are "not trained in the art of persua-
sion" and that the accounting profession "emphasizes independence and ob-
jectivity, not advocacy."364
Does this professional distinction make sense in light of the fact that
nearly all businesspeople today engage in persuasion?365 Nonetheless, a
strong analogy can be made to what accountants and transactional lawyers
do. Because transactional lawyers are not seeking to convince potentially
357. In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412, 438-39 (1978).
358. Id. at 414-17.
359. See id. at 422, 439.
360. See id.
361. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT, R. 7.3(a) (2011) (Public Interest
Exception).
362. Louise L. Hill, A Lawyer's Pecuniary Gain: The Enigma of Impermissible So-
licitation, 5 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 393, 417 (1991) (arguing that the ethical
prohibition should focus on the context of the conduct and eliminate specific
targeted conduct rather than the global prohibition on solicitation).
363. Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 774 (1993).
364. Id. at 775.
365. See supra text accompanying note 349.
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vulnerable clients to initiate litigation in which the attorney has a direct mon-
etary interest, Rule 7.3(a)'s prophylactic framework makes less sense.
The proposed modification to Rule 7.3(a) will not harm the legal profes-
sion or lead to more attorney misconduct. The modification would merely
represent a shift from a prophylactic rule to a rule focused on specific kinds
of misconduct. Moving from an expansive prophylactic approach makes
good policy sense for two reasons. First, consumers will benefit from in-
creased information about legal services, specifically because the rule would
allow diversification of sources for this kind of information.
Second, relaxing the longstanding ban on direct solicitation would cor-
rect an imbalance in the ethics rules, which many criticize for favoring elite
lawyers working in a large firm setting. The passive standard ingrained in the
ethics rules ("Let business seek the young attorney") only applies to attor-
neys working at corporate law firms where reputation, visibility, and a strong
social network help bring in business.366 On the other hand, for individual
lawyers who represent individual clients, the ethics rules hamper the ability
to build a practice.367 This codified passivity standard allows elite lawyers to
label solo practitioners' solicitation of business as unethical.368 The rules al-
low upper-level lawyers to cloak themselves in the mantle of the virtuous
lawyer while excluding solo practitioners from claiming this status. 369 In this
way, the rules engender further stratification in the profession. Liberalizing
the rules to allow direct solicitation would end this unfortunate imbalance.
This change would also help indie lawyers build up a business, ultimately
making the independent practice of law more sustainable.
C. Multi-State Practice: Enabling Long Tail Markets for Legal
Services
Model Rule of Professional Conduct 5.5(b)370 should be revamped so
lawyers can practice law across geographic borders, particularly if legal ser-
vices can easily conform to variations in state law. The Uniform Bar Exami-
nation371 is one potential way to achieve this goal.
366. AUERBACH, supra note 262, at 41-42 (quoting GEORGE SHARSWOOD, ESSAY
ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS (1854)).
367. Id. at 43.
368. Levin, The Ethical World of Solo and Small Law Firm Practitioners, supra
note 7, at 311-12.
369. See Zacharias, What Lawyers Do When Nobody's Watching, supra note 262, at
1014-15.
370. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT, R. 5.5 (2013).
371. Nat'l Conference of Bar Examiners, The Uniform Bar Examination (UBE),
NAT'L CONF. OF B. EXAMINERS, www.ncbex.org/about-ncbe-exams/ube (last
visited Sept. 20, 2014).
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This article posits that a latent market for legal services and a latent
demand for individualized, bespoke legal services exist. However, indie law-
yers need enough clients to allow them to profitably deliver customizable
legal products to capitalize on this demand. Thus, lawyers must be able to
capture clients from all across the country, not just one jurisdiction.
Model Rule of Professional Conduct 5.5(b), in its current form, prevents
lawyers from harnessing technology to access long tail markets.372 Lawyers
have access to technology that delivers services without the burden of geo-
graphic limitations. Nonetheless, the ethics rules impose a "tyranny of geog-
raphy"373 that prevents individual lawyers from creating new, transformative
markets for legal services. As Stephen Gillers has argued, "technology does
not recognize [geographic] borders." 374 "[W]e require a new ... governing
principle beyond geography."375 Gillers is correct because technology renders
geography obsolete376 and has opened up the possibility of unleashing new
long tail markets.377 However, the ethics rules prevent lawyers from even
trying to unlock long tail markets.
For instance, Richard Granat, one of the pioneers of delivering legal
services on the Internet, has built a successful practice by cornering the mar-
ket for accessible family law products in Maryland.378 Fortunately, there was
a sufficient demand for his product within the State of Maryland.379 But what
about the lawyer who envisions a demand for simple, customized agreements
musicians can use to govern their relationships as they produce music and go
on tour? Sufficient demand for that type of law product will probably not
exist if the market is limited to one state. But, if we expand the net to the
entire United States, then a market for such a product could emerge.
As Stephen Gillers and others have argued, the Uniform Bar Examina-
tion (UBE) could solve the problem.380 The UBE, which is produced by the
372. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT, R. 5.5(b) (2013) (prohibiting attor-
neys from providing legal services in jurisdictions where they are not admitted,
subject to some limited exceptions); see also ANDERSON, supra note 164, at
52-53 (explaining the theory behind long tail markets).
373. See ANDERSON, supra note 164, at 17, 162-64.
374. Stephen Gillers, A Profession, If You Can Keep It: How Information Technol-
ogy and Fading Borders Are Reshaping the Law Marketplace and What We
Should Do About It, 63 HASTINGS L.J. 953, 962 (2012) [hereinafter Gillers, A
Profession, If You Can Keep It].
375. Id.
376. See id. at 972-79, 992, 997-98, 1001.
377. ANDERSON, supra note 164, at 53-57.
378. Ward, supra note 115.
379. See id.
380. See Gillers, A Profession, If You Can Keep It, supra note 374, at 966, 971,
999-1001, 1120 nn.52 & 185 (citing Tiffany M. Williams, Examining the Fea-
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National Conference of Bar Examiners, is a single test that an applicant can
use to gain admission to several states. 38' Fourteen states have already
adopted the UBE, although some require a separate educational component
or separate jurisdiction-specific test.382 In addition to the UBE, states must
agree to lessen their admission fees and bar dues. Most lawyers will still not
have an increased practice area within reach if they are required to pay exces-
sive admission fees and yearly dues.383 If states are unwilling to liberalize
restraints on multi-jurisdictional practice, another solution is a more organ-
ized federal bar for lawyers practicing in areas like immigration and tax.384
Another potential solution is a broader federal law license promulgated under
Congress's Commerce Clause power.385
D. Ownership Structure and Multi-Disciplinary Practice B
Empowering Social Enterprise and Interdisciplinary
Law Firms
Model Rule of Professional Conduct 5.4386 should be modified to allow
nonlawyers to participate in legal businesses so that the indie practice of law
may flourish. Rules 5.4(a)387 and 5.4(d)388 prevent nonlawyers from partici-
pating in or owning any aspect of a law business. Rule 5.4(b) prohibits inter-
disciplinary models of law practice, like where a lawyer wants to form a
sibility of a National Uniform Bar Exam, ABA LITIG. NEWS (Jan. 28, 2010),
http://www.abanet.org/litigationnews/top-stories/national-bar-exam.html (ex-
plaining that the "recent resurgence of interest in a potential national uniform
bar exam has sparked debate in the legal community")).
381. See Gillers, supra note 380.
382. See id. (clarifying that "Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Colorado, Idaho, Minne-
sota, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, New Hampshire, North Dakota, Utah,
Washington, and Wyoming" have adopted the UBE).
383. See Larry E. Ribstein, Lawyers as Lawmakers: A Theory of Lawyer Licensing,
69 Mo. L. REV. 299, 304, 310-11 (2004) [hereinafter Ribstein, Lawyers as
Lawmakers] (arguing that the high cost of becoming licensed to practice law in
various states makes it impractical).
384. See id. at 319-21.
385. See id. at 319-21, 364 n.95 (citing Stephen B. Burbank, State Ethical Codes
and Federal Practice: Emerging Conflicts and Suggestions for Reform, 19
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 969, 974 (1992); Ted Schneyer, Professional Discipline in
2050: A Look Back, 60 FORDHAM L. REV. 125, 129 (1991); Fred C. Zacharias,
Federalizing Legal Ethics, 73 TEX. L. REV. 335 (1994)).
386. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT, R. 5.4 (2013).
387. See id. R. 5.4(a) (prohibiting a law firm from sharing legal fees with a
nonlawyer).
388. See id. R. 5.4(d) (prohibiting nonlawyers from owning any interest in a law
business).
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partnership with a nonlawyer, such as a family counselor.389 Striking these
unnecessary restrictions will allow lawyers to explore alternative community-
centered formats for legal businesses.
These rules have been criticized primarily as antithetical to innovation
because they prevent the corporate practice of law.39° Consequently, both the
kind of capital a law firm can raise39' and the scale that a law business might
achieve are restricted.392 The other argument is that excluding nonlawyers
from the law business maintains silos between disciplines and closes off the
law to outsiders who might contribute innovative solutions.393
The American Bar Association must also rid the code of these rules for
reasons other than the standard economic ones. Relaxing these rules would
generate alternative models of law practice: egalitarian business models
grounded in both commerce and community. For example, some want to
create a social enterprise394 law firm that pursues the hybrid goal of generat-
ing a profit and achieving social objectives.395 The organizers of a social
enterprise law firm model might want to structure it as a cooperative.396 A
law cooperative would give all business members a voice in management and
an ownership interest opportunity.397 Another alternative model could include
a law collective, which also rejects a hierarchical organizational structure and
389. See id. R. 5.4(b) (prohibiting lawyers from forming partnerships with
nonlawyers).
390. See, e.g., Hadfield, Legal Infrastructure, supra note 13, at 55-56 (discussing
the limitations on the corporate practice of law and innovation).
391. See id. at 55-57; Hadfield, The Cost of Law, supra note 341, at 54-55; see also
Larry E. Ribstein, The Death of Big Law, 2010 Wis. L. REV. 749, 788-89,
803-04 (2010); Ribstein, Lawyers as Lawmakers, supra note 383, at 314; Gil-
lers, A Profession, If You Can Keep It, supra note 374, at 1007-10; Gillers,
What We Talked About When We Talked About Ethics, supra note 391, at 268.
392. See Hadfield, The Cost of Law, supra note 341, at 44, 49-54; Knake, Democra-
tizing the Delivery of Legal Services, supra note 341, at 5-7.
393. See Hadfield, Legal Infrastructure, supra note 13, at 56.
394. Reiser, supra note 127, at 681 (A social enterprise organization is a hybrid
business organization that pursues both profit and community oriented goals.).
395. See ORSI, PRACTICING LAW IN THE SHARING ECONOMY, supra note 122, at 8,
36-52 (discussing various alternative models for law practice that embrace the
social enterprise concept).
396. See id. at 36, 38 (discussing the cooperative as a type of "sharing economy law
practice").
397. See id. at 38-41; see also EAST BAY CMTY. LAW CTR., GREEN-COLLAR CMTY
CLINIC & SUSTAINABLE ECON. LAW CTR., THINK OUTSIDE THE Boss: HOW TO
CREATE A WORKER-OWNED BUSINESS 1, 1-2 (rev. 4th ed. 2014), available at
www.academia.edu/182953 1/ThinkOutside theBossHow toCreate-a_
Worker-OwnedBusiness (explaining the structure and benefits of a "worker
cooperative").
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the division between attorneys and laypersons.398 The social enterprise con-
cept has given rise to a number of other forms indie legal businesses could
utilize, such as "the low-profit limited liability company, the benefit corpora-
tion, the benefit LLC, the flexible purpose corporation, and the social-pur-
pose corporation."399 Nonetheless, ethics rule 5.4(d) would not allow these
models to be used in a way that embraces layperson participation or
ownership.400
Rules 5.4(b) and 5.4(d) harm the indie law business model by unneces-
sarily cordoning other disciplines from law businesses. For instance, imagine
that a forward-thinking lawyer wanted to create a business that combined
family law legal services, dispute resolution mechanisms, and counseling ser-
vices. The ethics rules would not allow the nonlawyers to receive an owner-
ship interest in this business or participate in its management. 40' These
restrictions hamper the massive economies that could be achieved if corpora-
tions were allowed to deliver legal services to individual consumers. 402 More-
over, the rules prevent innovative, small-scale business models from getting
off the ground.403 The rules prevent innovation like the Wal-Mart style deliv-
ery of legal services4 o4 and sustainable innovation that can benefit both cli-
ents and individual lawyers.405
The recommendation here is that the Bar Association rid the specific
prohibitions within Rules 5.4(a), 5.4(b), and 5.4(d). In their place, Rule 5.4
would simply prohibit nonlawyers from regulating the lawyer's independent
professional judgment regarding the representation of a client. This language
398. See ORSI, PRACTICING LAW IN THE SHARING ECONOMY, supra note 122, at 38,
42-44.
399. Reiser, supra note 127, at 683.
400. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT, R. 5.4(d) (2013); see also Hadfield,
The Cost of Law, supra note 341, at 46-47 (There is an argument that Rule
5.4(d) might allow a non-profit business model, which seems to countenance
nonlawyer involvement in nonprofit law businesses); but see ORSI, PRACTICING
LAW IN THE SHARING ECONOMY, supra note 122, at 44-45 (It is unclear how
the ethics rules would treat these social enterprise forms because they are hy-
brid models.); Reiser, supra note 127, at 681, 685-86.
401. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT, R. 5.4(b), (d) (2013).
402. See Hadfield, The Cost of Law, supra note 341, at 44, 49-54; Knake, Democra-
tizing the Delivery of Legal Services, supra note 341, at 5-7.
403. Hadfield, Legal Infrastructure, supra note 13, at 55.
404. See, e.g., Legal Services Act, 2007, c. 29, §§ 89-102, sch. 13 (Eng.) (This law
is colloquially known as the Tesco law, because it enables large retail chains
that are not owned by lawyers to deliver legal services); see also Moliterno,
supra note 338, at 899; Knake, Democratizing the Delivery of Legal Services,
supra note 341, at 6-8 (discussing Wal-Mart's delivery services).
405. See Hadfield, The Cost of Law, supra note 341, at 61.
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would effectively capture the conflicts of interest the existing rules seek to
prevent. 06 More expansive and specific prohibitions are unnecessary.
E. Lawyer Speech: Promoting Supportive Communities for Indie
Lawyers
New technology enables new forms of community spaces that are not
constrained by geography or real estate. 4o7 Listservs, blogs, and discussion
boards provide an online community where attorneys can talk shop and re-
ceive mentoring and advice on questions about attorney ethics.408 Robust on-
line communities are important for attorneys practicing on their own because
they lack the kind of safety net enjoyed by attorneys practicing in a large-
scale setting.409 This difference in practice structure likely explains why solo
practitioners receive more attorney discipline than attorneys working in
larger firms.410
As previously discussed, attorneys must speak freely about the practice
of law for these online communities to flourish.411 Speaking freely necessa-
rily includes a broad right to criticize the judiciary. To this end, Model Rule
of Professional Conduct 8.2 needs modification to give greater speech pro-
tections to attorneys. 412
Rule 8.2 prohibits lawyers from "mak[ing] a statement that the lawyer
knows to be false or with reckless disregard as to its truth or falsity concern-
ing the qualifications or integrity of a judge, adjudicatory officer or public
legal officer . . . ."413 The language of Rule 8.2 tracks the language of N.Y.
Times v. Sullivan, the Supreme Court case that enshrined the "actual malice"
standard into First Amendment defamation law.4 14
406. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT, R. 5.4 cmt. 1-2 (2013); see also
Knake, Democratizing the Delivery of Legal Services, supra note 341, at 5-6
(explaining that the prohibitions in the rules are "purportedly justified by con-
cems about ... conflicts of interest").
407. See JENKINS ET AL., supra note 138, at 50; Jewel, I Can Has Lawyer, supra
note 96, at 356-62.
408. See supra notes 137-47 and accompanying text.
409. See Bauer, supra note 145, at 6-7; see also Levin, supra note 7, at 387-88
(advocating that solo practitioners should be encouraged to affiliate with an-
other lawyer to create a safety net).
410. See Bauer, supra note 145, at 6-7; see also Levin, supra note 7, at 387-88
(advocating that solo practitioners should be encouraged to affiliate with an-
other lawyer to create a safety net).
411. See Jewel, I Can Has Lawyer, supra note 96, at 362.
412. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT, R. 8.2 (2013).
413. Id.
414. Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1960).
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The problem with Rule 8.2 is that the actual malice standard that applies
to other members of the public is not the same standard that applies to attor-
neys. 4 15 Attorney speech that criticizes the judiciary is held to a higher stan-
dard.416 For instance, this article previously discussed a Florida defense
attorney who was disciplined for speaking out online about his perception
that a judge was being unfair and arbitrary.417 Specifically, he called the
judge an "Evil, Unfair, Witch," stated that she had an "ugly condescending
attitude," that she was "unfit for her position," and that she was "seemingly
mentally ill."418 Typical First Amendment defenses, including review of Con-
way's mindset in making the statement to ensure it rose to the reckless disre-
gard standard,4'9 the requirement that speech of public concern be "provably
false,"420 and the general rule that rhetorical hyperbole is not actionable defa-
mation421 did not play a large role in resolving the disciplinary action. Rather,
the Florida State Bar argued that upholding the public reputation of the legal
profession and the judiciary was more important than an individual attor-
415. See Margaret Tarkington, The Truth Be Damned: The First Amendment, Attor-
ney Speech, and Judicial Reputation, 97 GEO. L.J. 1567, 1569 (2009) ("[M]ost
state judiciaries have read the ... [actual malice] standard out of the language
of Model Rule of Professional Responsibility 8.2, interpreting it and other rules
to punish speech that impugns the integrity of the judiciary without requiring a
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04/Sean-Conway-Florida-Bar-lnvestigation-Letter.pdf. ("Conway believed he
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ney's free speech rights.422 The Florida Supreme Court accepted the Florida
Bar's reasoning.423
Imposing discipline on lawyers like Mr. Conway who speak out against
judges is the wrong result. This outcome chills the speech of attorneys who
inhabit online communities, which in turn inhibits the growth of these com-
munities.424 Both the democratic ideals that underlie free speech, as well as
its community building function, should have outweighed any concern over
the sanctity of the legal profession or the judiciary.425 Mr. Conway belonged
to an online community that was comprised of criminal defense lawyers.26
With the exception of high stakes white-collar criminal work, criminal de-
fense lawyers typically work as solo practitioners or in small firms.427 Law-
yers working for large firms have access to a community of practice that is
supported by the law firm's institutional structure. For instance, when a law-
yer working at a large firm experiences a frustrating encounter with a judge,
he or she can go behind closed doors to vent and receive counsel from other
firm members. However, lawyers working by themselves do not have this
option. The legal community should correct another imbalance in the ethics
rules and liberalize how lawyers speak in online communities.
V. CONCLUSION
Technology, market, and cultural forces have laid the groundwork to
transform the solo practice of law. Although many areas of legal services
have moved from an individualized model to a larger model, current trends
that emphasize resilience, community, and DIY practices point toward a pos-
sible latent consumer demand for individualized, tailored legal services. This
article focused on possible latent markets for private- law, transactional prod-
ucts, but it might be possible to apply technology to reach long tail markets
for legal products that require interaction with the court system as well. This
will become a reality if courts become more technologically advanced and
allow lawyers to appear virtually.
There are a few indie lawyers practicing in California. Currently, the
trend is in an infant stage. The current ethical rules need to be remodeled for
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Wagner, 212 So. 2d 770, 772-73 (Fla. 1968)).
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that the problem with lawyer free speech is that the fact-finders who are decid-
ing lawyer discipline cases are not the equivalent of an impartial jury. In cases
where the judiciary is purportedly defamed, members of the judiciary decide
the lawyer's fate).
424. See Jewel, I Can Has Lawyer, supra note 96, at 357-59.
425. See id.
426. Id. at 357.
427. See id. at 356.
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it to grow. Liberalizing the ethical rules for lawyers to stimulate more inno-
vation and competition in the legal services market is a viable theory. But
beyond these economic rationales, one must consider how changes to the
ethical rules might produce a more sustainable legal profession that can bene-
fit both individual lawyers and clients.
The indie style of law practice raises exciting possibilities for transform-
ing the practice of law and making the solo practice of law more engaging,
more fulfilling, and more community-centered. However, the ideas in this
article are not intended to promote the enduring value of a law degree or
encourage more students to attend law school with the hope of becoming a
successful indie entrepreneur. For the indie lawyer to truly take off, other
structural changes must happen. Reducing the cost of attending law school is
the most important reform. But even with the difficulties indie lawyers face,
both practicing and upcoming lawyers will successfully capture these latent
markets and pioneer a new style of lawyering.
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